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Abstract
This dissertation investigates three applications of emerging technologies for urban transportation. In the first chapter, we design a new market for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles (AVs), in which an AV is co-leased by a group of individuals. We present
a practical iterative auction based on the combinatorial clock auction to match the interested
customers together and determine their payments. In designing such an auction, we consider continuous-time items (time slots) which are defined by bidders, and naturally exploit
driverless mobility of AVs to form co-leasing groups. To relieve the computational burdens
of both bidders and the auctioneer, we devise user agents who generate packages and bid
on behalf of bidders. Through numerical experiments using the California 2010–2012 travel
survey, we test the performance of the auction design.
In the second chapter, we propose a reinforcement learning approach for nightly offline
rebalancing operations in free-floating electric vehicle sharing systems (FFEVSS). Due to
sparse demand in a network, FFEVSS requires relocation of electrical vehicles (EVs) to
charging stations and demander nodes, which is typically done by a group of drivers. A
shuttle is used to pick up and drop off drivers throughout the network. The objective of
this study is to solve the shuttle routing problem to finish the rebalancing work in minimal
time. We consider a reinforcement learning framework for the problem, in which a central
controller determines the routing policies of a fleet of multiple shuttles. We deploy a policy
gradient method for training recurrent neural networks and compare the obtained policy
results with heuristic solutions.
In the final problem, the application of the tandem of drone and truck for last mile delivery
is proposed. To take advantage of the different properties of drone and truck to deliver goods

vii

to customers, an efficient routing algorithm is introduced based on reinforcement learning.
The proposed method produces the routing policies of both drone and truck that identifies
customers served by drone, customers served by turck and includes recharging nodes for
drone. In this study we present, a novel model, called hybrid, consisting of an attention
encoder and a LSTM decoder to effectively route both drone and truck.

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction
Urban transportation refers to various systems designed to transport people and goods
inside a city or to the nearest suburban areas. In the last decades, urban transportation
has faced significant challenges with increasing urban population and density, as well as
congestion and pollution. Nevertheless, emerging technologies such as electrical vehicles
(EVs), unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), and autonomous vehicles (AVs) have a great potential to offer new forms of urban transportation. Especially, collaborative consumption
trends in urban settings such as shared rides and on-demand services lays down a road to
more sustainable transportation options that can be enhanced with emerging technologies.
This dissertation discussed three applications of novel technologies in urban transportation
and proposes practical tools such as models and algorithms to overcome their operational
challenges.
In the first application, we discuss using AVs in a fractional ownership market, where a
group of individuals can co-own a single AV. Such a novel form of vehicle ownership allows for
better utilization of resources in urban transportation. However, for the fractional ownership
market of AVs to work, a leasing company needs to match customers into groups based on
their travel needs and determine prices for each customer. We propose a combinatorial
iterative auction with bidder-defined items that allows customers to bid on a combination
of their trips with no restriction on their time and length as well as to learn bidding prices
needed to win bids. The auction outcomes determine both matching groups of customers
and their payments. The auction consists of two stages, wherein the first stage customers bid
for each time slot they are interested in and learn their individual bidding prices. We also
introduce activity rules in the first stage to suppress the strategic behavior of bidders. In the
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second stage customers bid for the combination of trips as a final bid. We propose a bidding
agent with several bidding options to bid on the behalf of the customer. In computational
studies, we compare various bidding strategies and study the effect of activity rules on the
bidders’ payoffs. We find that the designed activity rules successfully remove the strategic
behavior of bidders. We also find that core-selecting payment rule brings the largest revenue
to the auctioneer in most cases.
In the second application, we solve the operational challenges of free-floating electrical
vehicle sharing systems (FFEVSS), which represents an EV sharing system on-demand.
FFEVSS offers a sustainable option for urban transportation, but faces a challenging problem
of rebalancing the system, when EVs need to be charged and relocated to expected demand
locations every night. In the current practice, a group of drivers in a shuttle is routed around
for such a purpose. However, deploying a group of drivers to rebalance the system is costly,
thus requiring an efficient routing of shuttles to rebalance the system in a minimal time. We
propose a reinforcement learning approach to route multiple shuttles deployed in a network.
In particular, we discuss the Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulation of the problem
and introduce a policy learning method based on sequence to sequence to learn the routing
policies of multiple shuttles. Our numerical studies show that unlike the existing solutions in
the literature, the proposed methods allow solving the general version of the problem with no
restrictions on the urban EV network structure and charging requirements of EVs. Moreover,
the learned policies offer a wide range of flexibility, resulting in a significant reduction in the
time needed to rebalance the network.
In the last application, we consider recent advancements in drone technology that lays
out new opportunities in cost-effective last mile delivery. In particular, combining truck
and drone to deliver products to customers is a promising tandem. For instance, truck has
unlimited capacity and traveling range, but it has slow speed. Drone on the other hand has
high speed, but it has limited traveling range and weight carrying capacity. Therefore, to
take the advantages of their different properties, we must develop new routing decisions that
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enable recharging and reloading of drone. Formally known as Travelling Salesman Problem
with Drone (TSPD), routing of both drone and truck in a shared urban network is NPhard, highlighting the need for heuristic solutions. In this study we present, a novel model,
called hybrid, consisting of an attention encoder and a LSTM decoder to effectively route
both drone and truck. As our numerical studies show, the hybrid model performs well both
in solution quality and computational time as compared to the heuristics existing in the
literature.
In summary, the goal of this dissertation is to answer the following questions:
• How to design a market for fractional ownership of AVs?
• How to efficiently route multiple shuttles to rebalance FFEVSS?
• How to efficiently route drone and truck for last mile delivery?
The dissertation can be summarized as follows: in Chapter 2, we propose the design
of an iterative combinatorial auction with bidder-defined items for fractional ownership of
autonomous vehicles. Chapter 3 presents a reinforcement learning approach to route multiple
shuttles to rebalance FFEVSS. In Chapter 4, we introduce a novel hybrid model to efficiently
route drone and truck for last mile delivery. Chapter 5 gives the final remarks by summarizing
the discussed problems and provides future research directions.
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Chapter 2: Combinatorial Auction with Bidder-defined Items for Fractional
Ownership of Autonomous Vehicles
The copyright permissions for reuse previously published material in this chapter can be
found in Appendix A.
2.1 Introduction
Since the invention of the assembly line, vehicle ownership has been a distinctive part of
the American culture, placing the country on the leading positions by vehicles per capita.
The current model of vehicle ownership is, however, neither cheap nor efficient. In fact, the
total auto-loan amount in the country exceeded $1.24 trillion in 2018, while in 95% of the time
cars are parked (Center Microeconomic Data , 2018; Shoup, 2005). Nevertheless, in recent
years collaborative consumption has been accounted for dramatic changes in transportation.
The wide spectrum of new services ranging from ride-sharing (Uber, Lyft and etc.) to peer
to peer car renting (Buzzcar, Drivy and etc.) has influenced the traditional view of vehicle
ownership. This can be observed in the increase of 7 years on the average age of new
vehicle buyers (Kurz et al., 2016). Consequently, to satisfy the potential shift in consumer
demand, car-manufacturers have launched various car-sharing services (Maven by GM, Audi
on Demand, etc.), thus seeking new forms in vehicle ownership.
Motivated by the recent advancements in autonomous transportation technologies (Akbar
et al.; Gu et al.), this study investigates a novel form of vehicle ownership called fractional
ownership of autonomous vehicles (AVs), where an AV is co-leased by a group of individuals.
Thus, ‘fractional ownership’ means that customers co-lease a vehicle and ‘co-owners’ mean
co-lessees. The benefits of such ownership include reduced costs and increased utilization
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of vehicles coming from collaborative consumption. A fractional ownership model had been
tested with regular vehicles (Ford Credit Link, Nissan Micra Go & Get) and it had encountered significant challenges. The most critical challenge came from the need to relocate a
vehicle from the location of one customer to the location of another customer. Therefore,
only customers living in the closest neighborhoods were allowed to group together, thus offering limited options. In addition, in the fractional ownership of the regular vehicles market,
customers were asked to find co-leasing groups themselves, highlighting the absence of market design mechanisms. Because of such limitations, the above-mentioned programs have
been discontinued.
In this study, we propose using AVs for the fractional ownership market. AVs naturally
solve the above-mentioned relocation issue since they have driverless mobility. Therefore,
using AVs in fractional ownership model allows to attract a large pool of customers from
various neighborhoods with diverse travel needs. Also, when using AVs, co-leasing may be a
more viable service due to the maintenance and parking costs. As compared to ride-sharing
(Smet, 2021) or car rental services, the fractional ownership of AVs do not require customers
to look for rides or rental cars every time, but instead provides a long-term predictable
service on fixed rates. The premise of the fractional ownership model is in its convenience
for customers to use the same AV for each ride while co-owning it with the fixed set of
customers. For instance, a customer may store a child safety seat in the AV while taking
low health risks associated with a shared vehicle. Lastly, the long term commitment nature
of the fractional ownership allows both for customers and service companies to have a long
planning horizon.
For a practical fractional AV ownership model to be successful, there must be no time
conflicts among co-owners. In fact, the origins and destinations of trips also need to be
considered to incorporate traveling times of empty AVs. Therefore, a suitable mechanism is
needed to match customers with non-overlapping time-schedules together and avoid conflicts.
There are two popular mechanisms to match customers. The first is matching-theoretic
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approaches, such as stable or maximal matching, commonly used by ride-sharing services
like Uber and Lyft; see Wang et al. (2018) and Zhang et al. (2020), for example. In this case,
a leasing company needs to solve two problems: to determine matching groups of customer
and to set prices for each customer. Since fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles (AV)
is a novel service, there is no benchmark for pricing, which poses substantial challenges for
leasing companies. The second mechanism is based on auction theory. The outcomes of
auctions not only determine matching groups of customers, but also determine the prices.
Indeed, auction mechanism has a potential to generate more revenue compared to matching
mechanism and it allocates time slots efficiently offering them to customers who value them
the most. Also, we need to note that customers are most likely interested in using AVs for
a combination of time slots (e.g. from home to work and from work to home). With these
in mind, in this paper, we design a combinatorial auction market for fractional ownership
of AVs as an alternative to the traditional full ownership model. In particular, the proposed
auction exploits the unique feature of AVs, thus their driverless mobility in forming co-leasing
groups.
Combinatorial auctions are suitable mechanisms to sell items or allocate resources in packages, instead of single items separately. They have been used widely across various industry
sectors (De Vries and Vohra, 2003; Pekeč and Rothkopf, 2003; Milgrom, 2019) including allocation of the spectrum right licenses to telecommunication companies and Internet pricing
(Hershberger and Suri, 2001). In transportation and logistics, combinatorial auctions have
gained attention for selling airport departure and arrival slots (Rassenti et al., 1982), truckload transportation (Zhang et al., 2015), city bus route market (Cantillon and Pesendorfer,
2006), and railway industry (Kuo and Miller-Hooks, 2015). Recently, researchers suggest
combinatorial auctions in the ride-sharing market for designing a more efficient shared mobility system (Hara and Hato, 2018), collaborative vehicle routing (Gansterer and Hartl,
2017) and public transportation systems (James et al., 2018).
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In the proposed auction market, the auctioneer is a car manufacturer or leasing company
that sells AVs, and the bidders are customers who are interested in co-leasing a car. The
auctioneer sells time-slot packages to bidders through an auction that gives the winners the
right to use the same vehicle in these time-slots within a week for a certain period. Each
time-slot package includes several time-slots covering the travel needs of customers.
Combinatorial auctions involve complex package valuation problems for bidders and allocation problems for the auctioneer. Customers have to value time slot packages. The
value of these packages may be different from the summation of the values of the individual
time slots. Iterative combinatorial auctions have been introduced to address this preference
elicitation problem. In particular, in iterative auctions bidders can bid iteratively, receive
feedback based on their rivals’ valuation and adjust their valuations (Pekeč and Rothkopf,
2003). This feedback information is valuable for the new products, where there is no benchmark for the pricing. Indeed, fractional ownership of AVs can be considered as a new product
with limited valuation insight for a customer. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of iterative
combinatorial auctions, where valuation information of time slots is exchanged between customers, may potentially lead to higher revenue compared to a single round combinatorial
auction (Parkes, 2006). Because of the above-mentioned reasons, the majority of combinatorial auctions with applications in various industries (spectrum auction, real estate and etc.)
are iterative in nature.
The existing combinatorial auction designs, however, do not fully capture the nature of
the bids in the market for fractional ownership of AVs. For instance, in determining winning
bids, the problem under study involves additional constraints to avoid time-conflicts between
bidders. To address such issues, Takalloo et al. proposed a single-round, combinatorial auction market with user defined continuous-time items for the fractional ownership of AVs.
The auction design of Takalloo et al. is based on the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), which possesses many desirable properties, but can suffer from low revenue for the auctioneer. In addition, due to the
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complex nature of combinatorial auctions, a single-round auction may limit opportunities
for bidders to fully learn about the market and express their preferences. In this paper,
we extend the settings of Takalloo et al. and design an iterative auction, as opposed to a
single-round auction, to overcome these limitations of the VCG mechanism.
The proposed Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) includes two stages: the clock stage
and the supplementary stage, which are designed to help customers to bid efficiently. The
clock stage consists of multiple rounds and gives insight to the bidders about the market
value of items. In each round, bidders submit bids for a package of time slots and observe
the ask prices from an auctioneer. Even though it is possible to design a single round auction
and avoid iterative bidding, in that case, customers have only a single shot to bid. Thus, in
a single round auction customers bid without any insights about the competitiveness of their
bids. Instead, in the proposed auction the clock stage serves as the price discovery for bidders (Ausubel et al., 2006). In the supplementary stage consisting of a single round, bidders
submit their final bids considering the ask prices from the clock stage. Consequently, the
auctioneer solves the winner determination problem (WDP) considering the bids from both
clock and supplementary stages and calculates the payments. To suppress the strategic behavior of bidders such as when bidders avoid bidding until the last round or bid intentionally
on undesired time slots, we use activity rules in both the clock stage and the supplementary
stage. In the auction, to elevate the burden of iterative bidding, customers are given a choice
to use user agents, a software tool designed to bid on behalf of bidders. The proposed user
agents offer several bidding strategies to customers and propose bidding packages based on
customers’ travel needs. We also consider different payment rules and compare them together to study the revenue of auctioneer. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study investigating the CCA as a market design for applications in transportation.
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2.1.1 Unique Challenges and Contributions
The setting of the problem under study is unique in several aspects. In most existing
combinatorial auctions, products are pre-defined discrete items. In the proposed auction
in this study, items are neither pre-defined nor discrete; instead, we consider bidder-defined
continuous-time items. Every possible time interval becomes an item when a bidder finds
it valuable. While bidder-defined continuous-time slots serve the interests of customers best
and result in greater social welfare compared to discrete-time slot (Takalloo et al.), the
infinite number of possible items cause new challenges as well. In particular, customers face
large scale valuation problems for all possible items (time slots). Selecting a suitable set
of time-slots requires substantial computational resources. In addition, due to its iterative
nature the proposed auction, compared to a single round auction by Takalloo et al., results
in the substantial increase in the number of bids, thus requiring new solution techniques
both for customers and the auctioneer.
The contributions of this study can be summarized as follows. First, we design a unique
iterative combinatorial auction for the market design of fractional ownership of AVs, namely
combinatorial clock auction with bidder-defined items. Second, we devise a fast algorithm for
determining the ask prices in the proposed auction setting. Third, we develop user agents
with different bidding strategies for generating packages as a support tool for customers.
Fourth, we test the performance of the proposed auction design under different payment
rules with the simulation studies.
Our numerical experiments show that core-selecting payment rule results in a relatively
high revenue compare to the other payment rules. We also find that activity rules, which
are based on the eligibility points, are effective under the bidder-defined continuous-time
items setting as they support consistent bidding while suppressing the strategic behavior of
customers.
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2.1.2 Outline
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows: In Section 2.2, we describe the
proposed auction design in the clock and the supplementary stages. In Section 2.3, we
investigate several payment rules and their effect on the auction outcome. In Section 2.4, we
introduce user agents who assist bidders in bidding in the clock stage and generating packages
in the supplementary stage. In Section 2.5, we present numerical experiments based on the
California 2010–2012 travel survey dataset and derive insights into the auction market for
fractional AV ownership. Lastly, in Section ??, we conclude the paper.
2.2 The Auction Design for Fractional Ownership of AVs
In this section, we design CCA for the fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles.
First, we define the continuous-time items and packages in the fractional ownership CCA in
Section 2.2.1. Next, we describe the first stage in the CCA which is the clock stage in Section
2.2.2. The clock stage can be viewed as a multi-round auction. In each round, the auctioneer
announces the ask prices, and the bidders bid on the desired items. The auctioneer calculates
the ask price based on the supply-demand balance. We present Algorithm 1 for calculating
the ask prices in Section 2.2.2.1. To ensure that bidders bid actively throughout the clock
stage and to remove the strategic behavior of bidders, we design some activity rules for the
auction which are based on the eligibility points of the bidders. We describe the activity
rules in the clock stage in Section 2.2.2.2. Next, we describe the supplementary stage which
is the final round of the auction in Section 2.2.3. In the supplementary stage, bidders submit
new bids based on the information they gain through the clock stage. Then, the auctioneer
considers all the bids submitted in the clock stage and the supplementary stage to solve the
WDP considering the spatial information of the bidders and the continuous-time items.
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2.2.1 Auction Setting
To better understand the fundamental elements of the proposed auction design, consider
a customer who is interested in using an AV in the following time slots: 7:30–8:00 AM, 4:40–
5:10 PM. In this case, the items are two mentioned time slots. The customer may submit the
following set of packages from the items: {7:30–8:00 AM}, {4:40–5:10 PM} and {7:30–8:00
AM, 4:40–5:10 PM}. However, each bidder can receive at most one package. More formally,
we introduce the definitions of an item, a package and a bid in the combinatorial auction as
follows:
Definition 1. An item in the CCA for fractional ownership of vehicles is a continuous time-slot uniquely defined by its start and end time that a customer selects based on her
schedule. Unlike the traditional CCA, there are no predefined items in the proposed auction
and a customer is given a choice to define an item.
Definition 2. A package is a combination of continuous time slots defined by a
customer.
Definition 3. A bid is a package submitted by a customer indicating start and end
time of her desired time slots along with spatial information of her trips.
In the proposed combinatorial auction, the auctioneer is a car leasing company who
wants to sell AVs, and the bidders are customers who are interested in co-leasing a car. The
auctioneer offers a homogeneous fleet of vehicles for co-leasing, while interested customers
enter into the iterative bidding. Customers submit their bids as combinations of time slots
and provide spatial information for their trips. The bidding language in the auction is XOR;
that is, the auctioneer will accept at most one bid from each bidder. The auction itself
consists of two stages: clock and supplementary stages with a set of rules specified below.
2.2.2 The Clock Stage
The clock stage in the proposed auction serves as price discovery for each possible item
and subsequently for each package, where package’s ask price equals to the summation of
11

ask prices of its items. In particular, at the beginning of each round of the clock stage, the
auctioneer announces ask prices for items and bidders bid on the desired items. Note that
the collection of items submitted by a bidder in round r form a package, which we call a
clock stage package. The bid price for a clock stage package is computed as the summation
of ask prices for items in the package. The customers can bid on the items that they bid
on previously or on the new items. Ask prices increase for the items with excess demand.
The clock stage continues until we have demand-supply balance or bids do not change in
two consecutive rounds. At the end of the clock stage, bidders learn the minimum bid price
required to win a particular item.
2.2.2.1 Ask Price Calculation
In the traditional CCA setting, finding supply-demand balance and determining the ask
prices is relatively easy. Since items are predefined, the auctioneer can easily count the total
demand for each item. Figure 2.1a shows the conventional CCA, in which items are defined
as hourly time slots. The auctioneer counts demand for each hour and indicates demandsupply balance. Figure 2.1b represents the proposed CCA with continuous bidder-defined
items (time slots). Each time slot can be identified uniquely by a start time and an end
time. Placing the start time and the end time of all submitted time slots in the time horizon
results in a set of time slices. Each item (time slot) includes a set of consecutive time slices.
To determine the ask prices for each item, the auctioneer specifies its corresponding set of
time slices. For a particular time slice, if the demand (the number of items which include
that time slice) is greater than the supply (the fleet size), then there will be a price increment
p for that particular time slice. The ask prices for an item in each round will be updated
by adding the summation of price increments for the corresponding time slices. Note that
we need to calculate the ask prices in each round of the auction. Algorithm 1 shows the
pseudo-code of the algorithm for determining the ask price efficiently, which is explained
below.

12

t1

t2

t3

Customer 1

Customer 1

Customer 2

Customer 2

t4

(a) Discrete auctioneer-defined items

t5

t1

t2

t3

t4

(b) Continuous bidder-defined items

Figure 2.1: Comparing the items in the conventional CCA and the proposed auction

Algorithm 1: Ask price calculation in round r
Input: All submitted items in round r denoted by I, fleet size |H|, and price
increment p
Output: Vector of ask price increment in r-th round p
1 Initialization: times ← ∅, soe ← ∅ ; // soe for ‘start or end’
2 for j = 1 to length(I ) do
3
push(times, sj ); push(soe, 1); // 1 for start time
4
push(times, ej ); push(soe, −1); // -1 for end time
5 sorted_times, sorted_idx
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

= sort(times);
sorted_soe = soe[sorted_idx]; // soe is sorted in the same order as sorted_times
j ← 1; count ← 0; conflicts ← ∅; p ← 0;
while j ≤ length(sorted_times) do
same_time_idx ← findall(sorted_times, sorted_times[j ]) // Finding a vector of
indices with the same time value as sorted_times[j ]
foreach m ∈ same_time_idx do
if sorted_soe[m ] = 1 then
count ← count + 1; // for start time
push(conflicts, same_time_idx[m ]);
else
count ← count − 1; // for end time
remove(conflicts, same_time_idx[m ]);
if

> |H| then
foreach n ∈ conflicts do
pn ← pn + p ;

count

j ← j + length(same_time_idx);
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Figure 2.2: Price determination through conflict detection in an auction with a single
vehicle (|H| = 1)

An intuitive explanation of the algorithm is illustrated in Figure 2.2a which represents a
CCA with three customers and a single vehicle. To find the ask price increments, we first
collect all the bids and place all the time slots into the time horizon and construct the time
slices (from t1 to t2 , from t2 to t3 , and so on). Next, we set a price increment p , where p
stands for price, for each time slice with excess demand. Note that the value of p is the
same in all rounds of clock stage. Then, the ask price for each item is updated by adding
the summation of price increments for its corresponding time slices. For example, as Figure
2.2a represents, the second customer’s bid consists of a single item which overlaps in three
time-slices with other items. In this case, the ask price for the second customer will be
increased by 3p .
While determining the ask prices for the items that have been present in the previous
rounds is a relatively easy task, it is not the case for new items. For example, as shown in
Figure 2.2b, the second customer submits a single item bid again in the next round, but with
a new item. Since this item has not been present in the previous rounds, the auctioneer does
not know the initial ask price. The auctioneer may set the initial ask price to 0 for all new
items, but it may lead the customers to submit new items all the time by slightly changing
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their previous bids. Therefore, the auctioneer requires a more effective way to determine the
initial ask prices for the new items. We propose an alternative approach for setting the ask
prices for new items. As can be seen in Figure 2.2b, for the new items submitted by the
second customer, we consider the corresponding time slices in the previous rounds. The ask
price for the new item will be set to the sum of price increments for the corresponding time
slices in the previous rounds. For example, if we consider Figure 2.2a as the first round,
and Figure 2.2b as the second round, the initial ask price for Customer’s 2 new items in
the second round will set to 2p . Similarly, the initial ask price for Customer 3’s new item
will be 0, since there is no conflict in any corresponding time slice in the first round. In the
clock stage, as the auction proceeds, the ask prices for the items increase and as a result,
the demand decreases until we achieve the supply-demand balance.
2.2.2.2 Activity Rules for the Clock Stage
Iterative combinatorial auctions, in general, are vulnerable to strategic behaviors of bidders. For instance, a bidder may not bid on her preferred items until the last round to keep
their prices from rising. To suppress such behavior, the CCA has another design element
called activity rules which are present in both the clock stage and the supplementary stage.
These rules restrict bidders to enforce them to bid actively and constantly through the clock
stage in order to be able to submit competitive bids in the supplementary stage.
Ofcom (2011) proposes some activity rules that have gained popularity among practitioners because of their simplicity. These activity rules are based on eligibility points that
bidders purchase with their initial deposit before entering an auction. The auctioneer assigns eligibility points to each item based on historical demand for that item. High historical
demand for a time-slot results in a high value of the eligibility point for that time slot. In
particular, the auctioneer determines the eligibility point for each hour (12:00 AM–1:00 AM,
1:00 AM–2:00 AM, ...) based on the historical data for the demand. Then the eligibility
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point for each item i (time slot) will be determined as:

ei =

X

δit et

t∈T

where et is the eligibility for each hour time-slot, and ei is the eligibility for item i, and δit
is the proportion of item i that falls in an hour time slot t. Formally, we can define the
eligibility point of items and packages as follows:
Definition 4 (Eligibility Points of Items and Packages). Let I denote the set of items
in an auction and let ei denote a preassigned eligibility point of item i. Then the eligibility
point of package k denoted by E(k) is defined as the sum of Eligibility Points of items in
P
the package, i.e. E(k) = i∈k ei .
Definition 5 (Eligibility Points of Bidders). If bidder j has submitted a bid on
package k in round r − 1, we say that bidder j possesses eligibility point Erj = E(k) at
the beginning of round r. This quantity is known as eligibility of bidder j in the literature
(Ausubel et al., 2011).
The bidders start with an initial eligibility point based on the bidders’ initial deposit.
We can state the following activity rule for the clock stage: for each bidder, the eligibility
points of her package at any round should not exceed her eligibility points at the beginning
of the round. Thus, bidders are required to bid large quantities to maintain their eligibility
in future rounds.
According to the activity rule mentioned above, the bidders need to bid constantly
throughout the clock stage. If they do not bid actively in each round of the clock stage,
their eligibility level decreases and they will lose the chance to submit packages in the supplementary stage. Figure 2.3 summarizes the clock stage of the proposed auction.
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Figure 2.3: Clock stage flow chart

2.2.3 The Supplementary Stage
The supplementary stage is the final round for the submission of bids. Unlike the clock
stage packages, whose bid prices are calculated as the summation of ask prices for the
corresponding items, the bid prices of supplementary packages are directly determined by
the bidders. In fact, bidders submit new packages based on the price discovery in the clock
stage (where they learn the ask price for each item) and their budget.
Next, considering the clock stage packages and supplementary stage packages, the auctioneer solves the winner determination problem (WDP) to determine the set of winners in
the auction. With the aim to relate the clock stage bids with the supplementary stage bids,
the following activity rules for the supplementary stage were introduced in Ofcom (2011):
• If a bidder submits a package exactly the same as in the final clock round (FCR), the
bidding price for that package should be greater or equal to the FCR package bidding
price
• If the FCR package is a subset of the submitted package in the supplementary stage,
in other words, new bids are introduced in the supplementary stage, then the following
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condition should hold:
cj (b) ≤ Cj (br ) + pr (b) − pr (br )

(2.1)

where cj (b) is the bidding price of bidder j for package b in the supplementary stage; r
is the last round when bidder j was eligible for package b; br is the package submitted
by bidder j in the r-th round of clock stage; Cj (br ) is the maximum bid price by bidder
j for package br in any round of the clock stage or in the supplementary stage; pr (br )
is the ask price in round r for the clock stage package br ; and pr (b) is the ask price
for package b in round r (note that if this package has not been bid in round r, we
determine the bidding price for that package in the same way as we determine the ask
price for newly introduced items in round r).
As mentioned above, the activity rules in the supplementary stage, put some restriction on
bidders’ bidding based on their bidding history in the clock stage. Thus, from Equation (1)
we can see that the difference between the bids prices for the newly introduced bid b and a
bid br cannot exceed their respective ask prices’ difference in round r. As for the posted bids,
their bid price in the supplementary stage should be no less than their maximum bid price
in the clock stage. This way the supplementary stage activity rules impose a relative cap
on a bid amount, which can strongly limit the competitiveness of packages not submitted in
the clock stage.
We also note that the proposed auction design may include reservation prices for an auctioneer. Thus, if the trips’ costs for the winning bids exceed the bids’ prices, an auctioneer
may not accept the auction outcome. In order to avoid such situation, all bidders before
entering the auction will be provided with the cost calculation formula. Then in the supplementary stage of the auction, the bidders submit bid prices no less than the summation of
the costs of trips in their packages. Next, we formulate the WDP for the fractional ownership
CCA.
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2.2.3.1 Winner Determination Problem for the Fractional Ownership CCA
Note that in the supplementary stage, customers submit start and end times of their
trips along with their bidding prices and spatial information. This information can be used
to obtain the approximated commuting time between the bidder’s locations. Also, only a
single bid of each bidder can be determined as a winner as mentioned before. Then each
winning bidder is assigned to a single AV, which will serve all her winning trips. Next, a
simple algorithm can be used to determine the conflicting bids, which are defined as bids
with overlapping trips. In particular, each pair of bids are examined to check if they overlap
by considering the start location, start time and end location, end time of each trip in the
bids. Based on the locations of the bidders, we estimate the travel time of an empty AV
between locations of two bidders. If the end time of the first bidder plus the travel time
of an empty AV is greater than the start time of the second bidder, we consider two bids
as conflicting. Once the conflicting bids determined, the auctioneer can solve the following
winner determination problem (WDP) with the objective to maximize social welfare, as
formulated in Takalloo et al., considering all the bids from the clock and supplementary
stages:

(WDP)

max
xbh

s.t.

XXX

cj (b)xbh

(2.2)

xbh ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J

(2.3)

j∈J b∈Bj h∈H

XX
b∈Bj h∈H

xbh + xlh ≤ 1 ∀h ∈ H, j, q ∈ J , b ∈ Bj , l ∈ Bq : b, l are conflicting

(2.4)

xbh ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J , b ∈ Bj , h ∈ H

(2.5)

In the above formulation, J denote the set of bidders and Bj denote the set of bids submitted
by bidder j ∈ J . Similarly, Bq is the set of bids of bidder q, who has a conflicting bid l ∈ Bq
with bid b ∈ Bj of bidder j. A binary decision variable xbh indicates whether bid b is assigned
to vehicle h ∈ H or not where H is the set of vehicles. Constraint (2.3) ensures that at most
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one bid of each customer will be determined as a winner. Constraint (2.4) is a conflict
constraint, which ensures that two conflicting bids do not share a vehicle. It usually takes a
considerable amount of time to find a high-quality feasible solution for problem (WDP) for
large instances.
However, we can use a sequential heuristic to solve the problem by decomposition. Since
we assume a homogeneous fleet of vehicles, we can decompose the combinatorial auction
problem into a |H|-round single vehicle combinatorial auction, following the approach of
Takalloo et al.. At each round, considering the set of remaining bidders, we solve the winner
determination problem for a single vehicle and find the winners. Then, we update the set
of bidders by excluding the winners from the list of bidders and go to the next round. This
procedure continues until we assign all the vehicles to the bidders.
At the end of the supplementary stage, after determining the winners, the auctioneer
calculates payments based on payment rules that will be discussed in Section 2.3.
2.3 Payment Rules
Choosing a suitable payment rule is an important part of the auction design, as it influences the bidding strategy of bidders and the revenue for the auctioneer. However, there is
no universal pricing scheme that guarantees both incentive compatibility and high revenue.
For instance, even though setting payments to submitted bid amounts is an intuitive choice,
Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that such payment rule results in demand reduction. In this
study, we consider three pricing rules; namely, proxy payments, VCG payments (VickreyClarke-Groves payments) and core-selecting payments. We introduce these payment rules in
this section.
2.3.1 Proxy Payments
The proxy phase (Ausubel et al., 2006) has been proposed as an alternative to the supplementary stage bidding. In the proxy phase, which follows the clock stage, first, each bidder
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submits her packages and their valuations to her own proxy agent. Then, the proxy agents
enter an iterative proxy auction on behalf of bidders. After each round r, the auctioneer
determines the provisional winners and increases the ask price prb for package b by p . Then
the agents select the set of packages with the nonnegative utility values to bid in the next
round by solving the following problem.

max
xb

XX

(2.6)

(vb − prb − p )xb

j∈J b∈Bj

s.t. xb ∈ {0, 1}

∀j ∈ J , b ∈ Bj

(2.7)

where xb indicates whether bid b is selected by proxy agent or not. The auction finishes
when there are no more bids offered by any agents and the final outcome determines winners
and their payments. Thus, we can look at proxy payments as iterative first-price payments
that are in the core; there is no other set of bidders willing to pay more than the selected
set of winners.
2.3.2 VCG Payments
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is known to satisfy incentive compatibility.
Under the VCG payment rule, truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for the bidders.
VCG payment πj for bidder j can be determined according to the following rule:
πjVCG

=

∗
ZWDP
−j



X
∗
∗
− ZWDP −
cj (b)xb

(2.8)

b∈Bj
∗
where ZWDP
and x∗ are the optimal objective function value and optimal allocation of winner
∗
determination problem under the set of bidders J and ZWDP
is the optimal objective
−j

function value of the winner determination problem under the set of bidders J \ {j}.
Although theoretically interesting, the VCG mechanism has shown serious practical problems (Rothkopf, 2007). It usually takes a considerable amount of time to solve the winner
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determination problem optimally. However, it is possible to solve relatively large problems
with a small optimality gap. When the solution is suboptimal, incentive compatibility and
rationality do not necessarily hold under the VCG mechanism.
Next, we consider core-selecting payment (Cramton, 2013), which is more practical compared to VCG and entails the desirable auction properties such as rationality, efficiency, and
core property (Day and Cramton, 2012).
2.3.3 Core-Selecting Payments
Payments are in the core, if there is no other set of bidders willing to pay more than
the set of selected winners (Day and Cramton, 2012). Suppose b∗ denote the winning bid
of bidder j, and cj (b∗ ) denote the bidding price for package b∗ . We wish to determine the
payment amount for b∗ which satisfies the core property. Day and Cramton (2012) propose
the following quadratic program to compute the core-selecting payments by minimizing the
Euclidean distance between VCG payments and core-selecting payments:

min
πj

s.t.

X

πj − πjVCG

2

(2.9)

j∈W

X

πj ≥ β S

0

(2.10)

∀j ∈ W

(2.11)

∀S ∈ S

j∈W\S

πj ≤ cj (b∗ )

where S denotes any set of bidders who are willing to offer more than the total payment of
0

winners in W and S denotes the set of all such possible sets. Variable πj is the core-selecting
payment for winner j ∈ W, πjVCG is the VCG payment for bidder j and cj (b∗ ) is the bidding
price for the winner j. Parameter βS denote the aggregate payment offered by set of bidders
S. Constraint (2.10) ensures that the total payment of the winners is greater than or equal
to the payments offered by any other set of bidders. Constraint (2.11) makes sure to satisfy
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rationality by enforcing the individual payments of the winners to be not greater than their
offered bid amounts.
Day and Cramton (2012) propose an iterative approach to solve (2.9)–(2.11) which finds
a set of bidders S in each iteration by changing the bids’ prices of the bidders in set W. In
particular, the WDP is resolved at each iteration by setting the bid prices of the bids of each
bidder in set W to cj (b) + (cj (b∗ ) − πjk ). The resulting new set of winners, S is then used to
solve (2.9) - (2.11). We can summarize this procedure as follows:
• Step 0. Set k = 0, S 0 = ∅ and πj0 = πjVCG .
∗
k
• Step 1. Set cnew
j (b) = cj (b) + (cj (b ) − πj ) ∀j ∈ W, b ∈ Bj .

• Step 2. Solve the WDP in (2.2)–(2.5) and define S as the corresponding set of winners.
0

Add S to set S .
• Step 3. Set βSk+1 =

P

j∈S

cj (b∗ ) −

P

j∈S∩W (cj (b

∗

) − πjk ) in (2.10)–(2.11).

• Step 4. Solve (2.9)–(2.11) to generate a new payment πjk+1 , go to Step 1.
• Stopping rule: The process repeats until the WDP with modified bidding prices does
not generate any new set of bidders S.
It is worth mentioning that in core-selecting payment method, we do not change the original
set of winners W, but we update their payments each time we solve (2.9) - (2.11).
2.4 User Agents in the CCA for Fractional Ownership of AVs
In general, vehicle ownership requires a substantial investment from household income.
As a result, customers may need to spend a considerable amount of time (e.g. several weeks)
in bidding in CCA for AVs. Moreover, it is not uncommon to see hundreds to thousands
of bids from each bidder in combinatorial auctions (Olivares et al., 2012). Considering the
time-consuming and the complex bidding process of the CCA, customers may be interested

23

in choosing user agents. User agents communicate with bidders to assist them in the bidding
process. In particular, as a supporting tool, user agents assist bidders by bidding through the
clock stage on behalf of them and by generating competitive packages in the supplementary
stage.
2.4.1 Bidding Strategies in the Clock Stage
The user agents relieve the computational burden of bidders. In particular, user agents
select items to bid in the clock stage according to some strategies which are determined by
the bidders. We propose the following bidding strategies for the user agents.
• Strategy 1 : Under the first bidding strategy, it is assumed that bidders know the
customers’ exact trip schedule. Under this strategy, customers submit the set of musthave and optional trips to the user agents. Considering the budget restriction and
the eligibility points, user agents first consider only the must-have items and solve the
following binary optimization problem to select the must-have items to bid in the r-th
round of the clock stage for bidder j:

max

X

s.t.

X

w

e i wi

(2.12)

ei wi ≤ Ejr

(2.13)

pri wi ≤ Bj

(2.14)

i∈Ij

i∈Ij

X
i∈Ij

wi ∈ {0, 1}

∀i ∈ Ij

(2.15)

where Ij is the set of bidder j’s must-have items, wi is a binary decision variable which
indicates whether item i ∈ Ij is selected for a bid or not, pri is the ask price of item
i in round r, ei is the eligibility point required for item i, and Ejr is the eligibility of
customer j at the beginning of round r. Constraint (2.13) satisfies activity rules in
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the clock stage and Constraint (2.14) considers the budget limitations of the customer.
The objective function maximizes the eligibility of the bidder, which helps her maintain
her eligibility in the future rounds and bid on more items. After selecting must-have
items, if any eligibility points remained, the user agent solves Problem (2.12)–(2.15)
for optional trips, by letting Ij be the set of optional trip items of bidder j. In such a
case, we must first update the values of both Ejr and Bj to account for used resources
to select must-have items.
• Strategy 2 : In the second bidding strategy, customers are required to submit their
valuation for desired time slots along with the budget constraints. We believe this is
not a demanding task for customers given the ride-sharing services benchmark prices.
Then user agents solve the following optimization problem for customer j in each round
r:

max
w

X

(vij − pri )wi

(2.16)

i∈Ij

s.t. (2.13), (2.14), (2.15)

(2.17)

where vij is the value of item i for bidder j. In the second strategy, the user agent
maximizes the utility of customer j by taking into account the ask prices for items in
the current round.
• Strategy 3 : Under the third strategy, at the beginning of auction, instead of submitting
the exact time schedule, customers submit an acceptable time range for each trip.
Then, in each round of the clock stage, the user agents select time slots in the submitted
ranges with the lowest ask prices. In order to find the lowest priced time slots, the
user agents consider the demand in each hour provided by the auctioneer. Algorithm 2
presents a suitable approach to find a set of items with the lowest price for the bidders.
(Note that since the number of continuous time-slot in each range is infinite, the user
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Table 2.1: Bidding strategies item selection in clock stage
Trips
M 7:15–8:00 AM
W 5:00–6:00 PM
Th 12:30–1:00 PM

EP

Ask Price

15
20
10

16
14
8

Trip type
must-have
must-have
optional

Valuation

Time range

11.03 6:45–8:30 AM
15.72 4:30–6:30 PM
10.90 12:00–1:30 PM

agents consider only a finite subset of them by discretizing the possible start time
within the range). After obtaining the set of items with the lowest prices, user agents
solve the same optimization problem as in Strategy 2 to determine the items.
Table 2.1 gives an example of the bidding strategies in fractional ownership CCA. A
customer provides as an input three trips with start time and end time information, out of
which a user agent needs to select some items for bidding in the next round. The customer
also indicates her budget as $50 and her current eligibility as 40 points.
After receiving the given input, a user agent calculates eligibility points and ask prices for
each trip (columns EP and Ask Prices in Table 2.1). If the customer selects the first strategy,
the user agent bid on the first and the second trip, since both of them are must-have trips and
have high eligibility. Under the second bidding strategy, the customer provides her valuation
for each trip (see Valuation column). In this case, the user agent bid on the second and the
third item, because they generate nonnegative payoffs. Lastly, under the third strategy, the
customer provides a time range for each trip, which suits customer travel needs (see Time
range column). For instance, for the first trip, a customer may consider 6:45–8:30 AM as
her acceptable time range. Then, user agent may consider 6:45–7:30 AM, 7:15–8:00 AM and
7:45–8:30 AM as possible items to bid. To choose the best item, the user agent determines
the time slot with the lowest price.
Note that as discussed before, the activity rules aim to remove the strategic behavior of
bidders. Hence, under an effective set of activity rules, we expect that the bidders’ payoff
does not differ from each other significantly, where payoff is defined as the difference between
a customer’s valuation of the bid and bid price. However, without any set of activity rules, we
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Algorithm 2: Package generation algorithm in the r-th round of Clock Stage under
Strategy 3
Input: The set of desired items for the customer I r , aggregate demand until r-th
round each item i, Dir , demand in r-th round for item i, dri , set Rr which
includes the desired acceptable time range (li , ui ) for each item i, number of
vehicles |H|, price for item i submitted in r-th round pri , time increment by
user agents t , and trip length (ei − si ) for each item i.
Output: Set of items with the lowest prices I min
min
1 Initialization: I
← ∅;
r
2 foreach i ∈ I do
3
Dir = Dir−1 + dri ;
then
4
if pri = pr−1
i
min
5
push(I
, i);
6
else
7
if Dir > |H| then
8
remove(I r , i);
9
i ← find_item(i, Rr , t ); // finding set of items with the lowest
10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

prices
push(I r , i);

else
push(I min , i);

function find_item(i, Rr , t ):
k ← [li , li + ei − si ];
kmin ← k;
pmin ← prk ;
t ← li ;
while t + ei − si ≤ ui do
t ← t + t ;
k ← [t, t + ei − si ];
if prk < pmin then
kmin ← k ;
pmin ← prk ;
return kmin ;
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Table 2.2: Time slots submitted by a customer to the user agent
Trips

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

1
2
3

8:00–9:00 AM

8:00–9:00 AM
5:00–6:00 PM

8:00–9:00 AM
12:00–1:00 PM
5:00–6:00 PM

expect that the bidder’s payoff under the third strategy becomes higher. We will study the
impact of activity rules on bidders’ payoff under different strategies by presenting numerical
experiments in Section 5.
2.4.2 Automatic Package Generation in the Supplementary Stage
Generating competitive packages is challenging for bidders. The problem intensifies under
the proposed customer-defined continuous time slots, where an infinite number of items exist.
While iterative bidding in the clock stage reveals the minimum bid amount to win a certain
package of time slots, customers may find it useful to bid on other packages which are
generated by the user agents in the supplementary stage. In this section, we propose two
sets of automatically generated packages by user agents.
The first set of automatically generated packages rely on the bidding strategy selected
by a customer in the clock stage. For example, for customers who select the first bidding
strategy, the user agent may include all must-have trip time slots while generating other
packages which also include several optional trips. For the second strategy, we propose to
use a package generation technique similar to the internal-based strategy presented in An
et al. (2005), by adding items with the highest utility first while considering the budget
constraints. For the third bidding strategy, we propose selecting items that were chosen
most frequently in the clock stage by the user agent, since these items tend to have lower
prices.
The second group of packages are generated based on the day and the time of the trips
submitted by bidders. These packages are common among all bidding strategies. We propose
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Mon1
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Wed3

Tue2

Wed2

(a) A diverse package

Wed1

Tue1

Mon1

Wed3

Tue2

Wed2

(b) A consistent package

Wed1

Tue1

Wed3

Tue2

Wed2

(c) A single-day package

Figure 2.4: Diverse, consistent and single-day packages
generating diverse, consistent, and single-day packages. Diverse packages include time-slots
from different days. Consistent packages include the trips in different days which take place
in the exact same time. Single-day packages include only the trips within the same day.
To understand the package generation procedure for the second group, let us look at the
trips submitted by a customer given in Table 2.2. Figure 2.4 shows graphs used for generating
packages, where nodes represent time slots for submitted trips. For instance, Figure 2.4a
visualizes a diverse package, where time slots from different days have been connected with
edges while time slots from the same days do not. We use maximum cliques to generate
the second group of packages. Note that in graph theory a clique is a complete subgraph
of a given graph. A maximum clique is a clique with the maximum number of vertices. By
looking for a maximum clique in the graph, user agents generate a package, which consists
of all time slots within the clique. Another example is given in Figure 2.4b, which displays
a network for a consistent package. In this case, we connect nodes (time slots) with similar
start and end time of trips such as the first trips on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. Then
user agents again look for a maximum clique in the graph and select time slots within the
clique for a consistent package. Lastly, in the single-day package, we connect time slots from
the same day as shown in Figure 2.4c. The summary of all automatically generated package
types can be found in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Summary of all types of packages.
Packages
Must-have trips only
Must-have trips plus optional
Highest utility trips
Frequently chosen trips
Diverse package
Consistent package
Single-day package

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

2.5 Numerical Experiments and Case Studies
The goal of the numerical experiments is two-fold. First, we investigate the efficiency
of the proposed auction elements such as activity rules, the ask price algorithm and pricing
rules. Second, we discuss the auction outcomes to bidders and an auctioneer in terms of
winning bids and generated revenue.
For the numerical studies, we build a simulation module based on 2010–2012 California
Household Travel Survey, which indicates start and end time of trips as well as miles for 2908
vehicles for one week. Based on this data, we generate bids for customers. In practical, we
remove trips with a length less than 15 minutes from the data. Then each vehicle represents
a customer with the respective trips information out of which we generated bids as discussed
in Section 4. The location distances of each pair of customers are randomly selected between
0 and 60 minutes. Further, we use Caltrans Traffic Counts data, namely Annual Average
Daily Traffic 2016, for assigning required eligibility points for each hour of a week. All
instances are run 3 times using seeds 1, 3 and 5. For all our experiments we set the ask price
increment p = 2.
We use the Julia Language (Bezanson et al., 2012) to implement the simulation model
and CPLEX 12.5 to solve integer programs via the JuMP.jl package (Dunning et al., 2017).
We also use the heuristic algorithm by Takalloo et al. to solve WDPs not only to determine
the winners, but also solve sub-problems arising in various payment rules.
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The simulation model includes three modules that have different functionalities; namely
the general module, the auctioneer module, and the user agent module.
The general module in the simulation aims to generate trips, bidders, bids and etc. The
general module takes as input the number of bidders and the percentage of bidders with a
particular bidding strategy. Based on the given input, the module generates a set of bidders
and assigns them their initial eligibility points, budget constraints, selected trips, including
their start time, end time and miles.
The auctioneer module performs all the auctioneer’s tasks such as calculating ask prices
in the clock stage, enforcing activity rules, solving WDP and calculating payments. This
module takes as an input the fleet size to be auctioned and price increment for ask prices in
the clock stage in the absence of supply-demand balance.
The user agent module performs all the user agent’s tasks. As discussed in Section
2.4, user agents bid on behalf of bidders both in the clock and the supplementary stages.
User agents also generate packages for bidders. This module takes as an input the bidding
strategies of the bidders.
2.5.1 Managerial Insights
To compare the different bidding strategies offered by user agents and check the efficiency
of the proposed activity rules, we conduct experiments under 4 different scenarios discussed
below. In each scenario, we simulate an auction with 21 bidders and a single AV. We let a
bidder select strategy 1, 2, or 3 for the clock stage and consider the following scenarios for
the rest of bidders:
• Scenario 1 : The rest of bidders select Strategy 1.
• Scenario 2 : The rest of bidders select Strategy 2.
• Scenario 3 : The rest of bidders select Strategy 3.
• Scenario 4 : The rest of bidders are split to select Strategy 1, 2, or 3.
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Table 2.4: The strategies comparison with Activity Rules
The total wins

The percentage of full wins

Scenario

Str1

Str2

Str3

Str1

Str2

Str3

1
2
3
4

55
62
59
58

44
46
51
48

47
51
52
50

57.69%
48.78%
42.86%
44.44%

19.23%
21.95%
28.57%
25.00%

23.08%
29.27%
28.57%
30.56%

Table 2.5: The strategies comparison without Activity Rules
The total wins
Scenario

Str1

Str2

Str3

1
2
3
4

32
34
27
43

36
48
38
42

42
47
50
51

The percentage of full wins
Str1

Str2

Str3

23.08% 38.46%
14.29% 47.62%
5.88% 23.53%
28.57% 32.14%

38.46%
38.10%
70.59%
39.29%

We run the simulation for 3 instances for each class (strategy-scenario combination) and
count the number of times (in 3 instances) a bidder has been selected as a winner under
different scenarios and strategies.
Table 2.4 reports the total number of times bidders win (in 3 instances) using different
strategies and under 4 scenarios and the percentage of full wins (when a bidder wins in
all 3 runs) when the proposed eligibility based activity rules are used. We observe that
the greatest number of wins is achieved under Strategy 1 regardless of any configuration
of scenarios. Similarly, bidders who select Strategy 1 are more likely be selected as a full
winners under any scenario followed by Strategies 3 and 2.
From computational studies, we may conclude that the activity rules effectively induce
the first bidding strategy. When the bidders with the third bidding strategy (who seeks to
bid for items with the lowest ask prices) enter the supplementary stage, they face a relative
cap on their bidding price induced by the supplementary stage activity rules.
Thus, submitting competitive bids under Strategy 3 is relatively harder compared to
bidding under the first strategy which is not restricted by activity rules. Indeed, under the

32

first strategy bidders consistently bid for must-have trips and gradually increase bid prices,
which is a favored behavior according to activity rules. This explains why a customer with
Strategy 1 tends to be a winner. Similarly, since under Strategies 2 and 3, item selection is
based on the value of ask prices, when entered into the competition for conflicting time slots,
customers with such bidding strategies most likely to choose less competitive items. Then a
bidder with the first bidding strategy encounters less competition with the bidders with the
second or the third bidding strategy, which increases her chance of winning.
We also run similar experiments in the absence of the proposed activity rules to investigate the auction outcomes under different strategies and scenarios. In particular, we removed
eligibility constraints in selecting bids presented in (2.13) for Strategies 1 and 2 and eliminated the objective function of Strategy 1 shown in (2.12). Also, we removed the relative
caps imposed by (2.1). Table 2.5 presents the results, which clearly indicate the prevalence
of Strategy 3 in the number of wins and in the percentage of full wins, while Strategy 1
results in the lowest number of wins in almost all scenarios. These experiment results clearly
indicates the importance and efficiency of the proposed activity rules to prevent strategic
bidding.
As discussed before, in order to select payment rules for the proposed auction, we used the
simulation model. In particular, we measure the generated revenue and the computation time
to compare VCG, core-selecting and proxy payments. We run the simulation model multiple
times by generating instances based on the different number of bidders, vehicle numbers
and bidding strategies in the clock stage while using the exact and heuristic approaches in
solving the WDP. We implement proxy-auction using safe start with VCG prices (Hoffman
et al., 2006). We also implement quadratic core-selecting payments suggested by Day and
Cramton (2012).
Table 2.6 reports the results when the WDP is solved exactly and |H| = 1. In this case,
core-selecting payments generate the highest revenue under all bidding strategies, while proxy
payments also demonstrate competitive revenues. We have to note that for proxy payments
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Table 2.6: Payments rules comparison using exact solutions
Revenue, $
|J | Bidders’ Strategy

VCG

Time, sec

Core

Proxy

VCG

Core

Proxy

30

Strategy 1 1,017 4,850
Strategy 2
889 1,193
Strategy 3 1,090 2,063
Mixed
779 2,930

2,960
1,055
1,728
1,469

9.89
85.83
102.58
63.87

10.96
91.39
108.73
67.31

112.55
387.10
5,404.54
286.86

60

Strategy 1 3,370 7,189
Strategy 2 1,478 2,267
Strategy 3 2,429 4,121
Mixed 1,970 4,582

4,858
2,012
3,666
3,052

57.95
457.23
682.35
247.25

60.24
193.32
471.25
656.90
703.44 11,695.41
254.72
662.30

90

Strategy 1 4,308 8,940
Strategy 2 2,191 2,954
Strategy 3 3,776 5,767
Mixed 3,003 6,172

6,405
150.66
155.08
827.98
2,711 17,573.46 17,898.58 15,056.72
5,304 7,468.69 7,641.55 14,730.09
4,313
751.17
769.80 5,875.49

calculation, we place a time limit of 4 hours and report the revenues generated within the
time limit. Nevertheless, the computation time of the proxy payment method is significantly
larger than those of other payment methods, while core-selecting payments dominate both
in terms of revenue and calculation time.
Table 2.7 reports the revenue and the computation time when the WDP is solved using
the heuristic method discussed in Section 2.2.3.1 for |H| = 2 and |H| = 3. We observe
that both under the exact and heuristic solutions the VCG payments dominate in terms of
computation time. When the WDP is solved using the heuristic approach, core-selecting
payments generate higher revenues compared to other payments except when |H| = 3 and
|J | = 120 with the proxy payments being the highest. Since the WDP is solved using the
heuristic solution, the VCG payments may violate individual rationality, thus resulting in
higher payments compared to core-selecting payments which enforce individual rationality.
Consequently, the warm start of proxy payments with the VCG payments results in larger
proxy payments compared to core-selecting payments. We place a time limit of 4 hours for
the proxy payments calculation and took the average run time for 3 replicates. Even though
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Table 2.7: Payments rules comparison using heuristic solutions under mixed strategy
Revenue, $
|H|

|J |

VCG

Core

2

90
120

2,756 8,771
4,904 11,018

3

90
120

170 10,069
17,496 12,948

Time, sec
Proxy

VCG

Core

Proxy

6,564 1,315 1,335 3,064
8,805 3,038 3,077 10,986
6,694 1,649 1,671
19,986 4,486 4,533

10,561
6,168

the time limit may cause lower revenues under the proxy payments, in general, we conclude
that core-selecting payments generate the highest payments using the heuristic solutions.
Therefore, based on the computational study we recommend using core-selecting payments
as a pricing scheme for fractional ownership of AVs.
We also study the auction outcomes to bidders measuring a number of co-leasers defined
as customers sharing the same AV and some statistics of the winning bids. For instance,
average values of payments, miles, time slots’ lengths and the number of trips are calculated
by summing their respective values for the winning bids and dividing by the total number
of winners. The number of bids indicates the average number of bids submitted by all
winners. We report the results of 3 replicates for each instance taken as their average values.
As shown in Table 2.8, the average payments increase with the increase in the number of
participating bidders due to the rise in the competition. From the used dataset containing
trips of customers, the average number of trips in the winning bids is above 2. We also note
that the average number of trips in the winning bids change slightly across all instances. Such
outcomes are related to the structure of the bids. For instance, bids with a large number
of trips encounter a significant number of conflicts with other bids, thus, requiring large bid
prices to win. In contrast, bids with a small number of trips have fewer chances to overlap
with other bids. Then when solving the WDP selecting a large pool of bids with a small
number of trips may contribute more to the social welfare compared to accepting a small
pool of bids with a large number of trips.We also note that the trip costs per mile and per
minute increase with the increased number of bidders. We may also enforce the minimum
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Table 2.8: The auction outcomes
Average Value
|H|

|J |

# co-leasers

Payments

Miles

1
1
2
2

30
45
60
90

23.30
31.33
26.33
34.67

38.76
47.91
22.56
69.80

39.65
30.33
33.91
29.04

Time, min # trips
74.46
60.66
69.36
58.93

2.88
2.49
2.82
2.45

# bids

WDP sol.

19.38
17.01
15.85
16.15

exact
exact
heuristic
heuristic

Computational time, sec

0.045
0.04

0.035
0.03

0.025
0.02

0.015
0.01

150

200

250 300 350 400
Number of Bids

450

500

Figure 2.5: The performance of the ask price algorithm

trip length requirement in the WDP. For instance, the auctioneer may require customers
to use AVs at least for 30 minutes per use. This may reduce the revenue of the auctioneer
as it limits options for serving small trips and increases the idle time of AVs. However, it
also offers more flexibility to winners in their schedule offering a wide time window between
serving two customers and making such an option more attractive. In return, such a setting
actually may boost the revenue.
Finally, to demonstrate the performance of the proposed ask price algorithm, we run
the algorithm under various bid numbers, while measuring the computational time. As has
shown in Figure 2.5, the algorithm solves all instances in a fraction of a second. Also, the
computational time increases linearly with the number of bids, suggesting O(n) complexity.
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Chapter 3: A Reinforcement Learning Approach for Rebalancing Electric
Vehicle Sharing Systems
The copyright permissions for reuse previously published material in this chapter can be
found in Appendix B.
3.1 Introduction
The advent of electric vehicles (EVs) and car-sharing services provides a sustainable option to move people and goods across dense urban areas. Car sharing services with EVs
have the potential to increase the utilization of resources and offer a unique opportunity to
the urban population in the form of free-floating EV sharing systems (FFEVSS). With the
FFEVSS, examples of which include companies such as car2go car2go (2021b) and WeShare
Volkswagen (2021), customers no longer need to own a vehicle and can conveniently pick
up/drop off any EV, on-demand, from the parking lots of designated service areas. However, there are some critical operational challenges to bring this on-demand service into the
mainstream.
Before the start of the day, an operating company needs to relocate EVs to the ideal
demand locations to establish a supply-demand balance in the system. Furthermore, to
provide a certain level of service, EVs need to be charged before they can be used by the
customers. There are two major issues: (i) there exists a sparse demand in the service area
network, and hence it is not trivial to find the ideal locations to relocate the EVs; and (ii)
there needs to be an efficient routing plan to drop off the drivers for picking up the EVs
and taking the EVs to the charging stations for charging, and then pick up the drivers from
their respective locations car2go (2021a). It is evident that without efficient solutions for
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Case II

2

2

1

1

Depot
0

Case I

Figure 3.1: The overview of the rebalancing problem of FFEVSS, with a single shuttle and
2 drivers. The numbers indicate the number of drivers in the shuttle. Solid and dashed
lines represent the routes of the shuttle and EVs, respectively. Cases I and II refer to
relocation of EVs without and with charging, respectively.
the above complex and costly operational challenges Chianese et al. (2017), the sustainable
existence of the FFEVSS is uncertain.
We consider a static, nightly rebalancing problem similar to Kypriadis et al. (2018);
Santos et al. (2017); Folkestad et al. (2020); Haider et al. (2019), where a group of drivers
is used to relocate and recharge the EVs based on the predicted demand for the next day,
assuming the utilization level of FFEVSS is minimal. As shown in Figure 3.1, shuttles are
used to support the movements of drivers. In this setting, rebalancing operations require
two key decisions to be made: (i) how to route shuttles to pick up and drop off the drivers
(shuttle routing decision) and (ii) where to charge and relocate each of the EVs (EV relocation
decision). In this paper, focusing on solving the shuttle routing decision problem, we propose
a reinforcement learning (RL) approach, in which the EV relocation decisions are made by
a rule-based approach.
The proposed RL approach possesses several advantages compared to optimization-based
approaches. First, unlike solutions coming from the static optimization techniques such as
Folkestad et al. (2020); Haider et al. (2019), which need to be re-solved each time an input
changes, the RL agent learns robust solutions that can be applied to any input coming from
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Su1

Su2
Ch1

Su1

Su2
Ch1

Ch2

Ch2

Figure 3.2: Assign supplier-charger pairs or reuse charger nodes? Ch and Su denotes
charger and supplier nodes respectively.
the same distribution Bello et al. (2016). Second, while static optimization approaches can
take significant time to solve a problem, a trained RL agent can be invoked to produce quality
solutions instantaneously. Third, many practical considerations can be flexibly incorporated
within the simulator in the training phase.
The shuttle routing to rebalance FFEVSS with its variety of trade-offs is not a trivial
problem. For instance, as depicted in Figure 3.2, one may allow or disallow the reuse of
charging stations in the derivation of solutions. The former choice offers more flexibility, but
it also increases the complexity of exploring solutions. Therefore, the existing methods do
not allow the reuse of the charging stations Haider et al. (2019). On the other hand, such a
choice results in opportunity loss.
Another trade-off is depicted in Figure 3.3, where the first supplier node has an EV that
needs to be recharged while the second supplier has an EV with a sufficient charging level.
Then one needs to balance between traveling time and waiting time when routing a shuttle
to supplier nodes. The complexity of such routing decisions increases with the network size,
the network structure, and the number of shuttles and drivers deployed. Hence, it may not
be possible to explore potential solutions with human-driven heuristics efficiently. With the
proven ability of neural networks in recognizing patterns in graph-based representations, the
utilization of neural network architecture with the proposed RL approach will provide better
approximations and assist in obtaining efficient solutions that can be generalized.
In recent years, there has been a surge of studies that apply reinforcement learning to solve
various traditional vehicle routing problems (VRPs) Nazari et al. (2018); Kalakanti et al.
(2019); James et al. (2019) with capacity constraints, time windows, or stochastic demand.
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Figure 3.3: How to balance traveling time and waiting time trade-off? De, Ch and Su
denotes demander, charger and supplier nodes respectively.
S0

a0 : SR0

S1

a1 : SR1
EVR0

S2

a2 : SR2
EVR1

Figure 3.4: State transitions: SRi - shuttle routing decisions, EVRi - EV relocation
decisions, ai - selected action
The shuttle routing problem, taken under this study, possesses significant differences with
traditional VRPs. First, in a VRP setting, nodes to visit (demand) are typically independent
of the routing decisions. However, in the shuttle routing problem, the locations of drivers
to be picked up are determined by preceding routing decisions. This highlights a strong
interdependence between demand and routing. Second, unlike VRP, the shuttle routing
problem is characterized by delayed rewards. As shown in Figure 3.4, the actual relocations
of EVs from a node happen after the execution of shuttle routing to the node. As a result,
we observe delayed rewards with respect to the shuttle routing decision only after EVs reach
their designated nodes. Such differences require a new approach to finding solutions for the
shuttle routing problem.
We consider two settings of rebalancing FFEVSS. In the first setting, we focus on a
single shuttle problem, where we train a single agent to learn routing policies. In the second
setting, we aim to train a fleet of shuttles through single-agent reinforcement learning, where
a central controller is responsible for routing multiple shuttles. In both cases, we deploy
policy gradient methods along with recurrent neural networks for training. The shuttle
routing problem under both of the above-mentioned settings possesses significant challenges
that prohibit the direct use of the existing solution methods. For instance, in routing a
single shuttle, we must train an agent not only to find efficient routes, but at the same time
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maintain the feasibility of the solutions related to the precedence of the visiting nodes. As
for routing the fleet of shuttles, we must promote learning policies to route multiple shuttles
that will contribute to a common goal.
The main contributions of this study are as follows. First, to the best of our knowledge,
this study is the first to present an RL-based approach for handling multiple vehicles explicitly in the context of VRPs, while focusing on the shuttle routing problem for rebalancing
the FFEVSS. Second, within the RL framework, we propose the utilization of deep neural
network architecture to process the complex and high dimensional observations from an urban service area network to help train the RL agent in its decision-making. In particular,
we adopt sequence-to-sequence models with an attention mechanism to fit the unique challenges of the rebalancing FFEVSS. Third, we present a novel training algorithm to route
efficiently a fleet of shuttles to rebalance FFEVSS by utilizing policy gradient methods. Our
training algorithm does not require splitting an urban network into sub-clusters for each
shuttle, but instead allows developing policies that efficiently utilize shuttles and drivers in a
whole network. Fourth, we develop a simulator to mimic real-world FFEVSS, which serves
as the environment for training an RL-agent and allows efficient exploration of joint actions
of multiple shuttles.
Unlike the solutions obtained using the methods from the literature, the empirical results
obtained from this study show that the proposed method allows solving the general version
of the problem with no restrictions on the urban network structure and charging levels of
EVs. The learned policies offer a wide range of flexibility, resulting in a significant reduction
in the time needed to rebalance the network.
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide an overview
of relevant literature and outline the unique challenges of the rebalancing FFEVSS. In Section 3.3 we present the problem formulation. In Section 3.4 we introduce the proposed
reinforcement learning model. In Section 3.5 we demonstrate the results of our computational studies.
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3.2 Related Work
Even though the problem of rebalancing FFEVSS has been recognized as essential for
their sustainable existence in the literature Schulte and Voß (2015); Herrmann et al. (2014),
most of the studies focus on high-level approaches to address the issue. One category of
studies falls on incentive-based methods that aim to rebalance the system through influencing customer behavior Weikl and Bogenberger (2013). Another set of papers study the
deployment of personnel and offer rule-based high-level decision-making frameworks Weikl
and Bogenberger (2015); Zhao et al. (2018). There are only a few studies that specifically
focus on the shuttle routing problem to rebalance FFEVSS, thus offering detailed solutions
for day-to-day operational challenges.
One of such studies is Folkestad et al. (2020), which aims to solve both EV relocation and
shuttle routing problems jointly. However, the proposed model does not enforce relocation
of EVs directly to demander nodes, but indeed permits leaving EVs in charger nodes. As a
result, charger stations will be blocked and cannot be reused, requiring the postponing of
charging for the remaining set of EVs. Similarly, a recent study Haider et al. (2019) presents
novel approaches in addressing EV relocation and shuttle routing problems simultaneously.
Even though the study aims at relocating EVs directly to demander nodes, it assumes the
abundance of charger stations in an urban network. Thus, again reusing charger stations
is not considered, and the postponement of charging for EVs requiring it is allowed. Since
charging infrastructure is often limited He et al. (2020), the reuse of charging stations must
be an integral part of solutions to rebalance FFEVSS in real-world urban networks.
Recently reinforcement learning approaches gained popularity to solve various problems
in transportation, including fleet management and rebalancing in ride-hailing services Shi
et al. (2019); Lin et al. (2018); Wen et al. (2017); Sadeghianpourhamami et al. (2018).
However, none of the existing studies focus on FFEVSS specifically and do not address the
unique issue of charging and relocation together. For solving VRPs, deep reinforcement
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learning has been first applied in Nazari et al. (2018), which utilizes sequence-to-sequence
methods Sutskever et al. (2014) and an attention mechanism Vinyals et al. (2015a). Later
Kool et al. (2018) adopted the transformer model Vaswani et al. (2017) to solve VRPs without
recurrent neural networks. James et al. (2019) proposes a novel model to solve online VRPs
by utilizing neural combinatorial optimization and deep reinforcement learning. Similarly,
Zhao et al. (2020) presents a hybrid model that combines local search with an attention
mechanism. However, these studies focus on routing a single capacitated vehicle, where the
main goal is to minimize the distance traveled. While multiple loops of a single capacitated
vehicle can be interpreted as multiple vehicles, this paper is the first to present explicit
modeling of multiple vehicles within an RL framework.
Although this study also adopts sequence-to-sequence models with an attention mechanism similar to Nazari et al. (2018), the significant differences in the nature of the rebalancing
FFEVSS problem and VRP dictate the development of novel solution techniques. For instance, in the given problem, shuttles need to leave a depot, drop off, pick up drivers who
relocate EVs, and return to the depot, highlighting two sets of constraints. First, the precedence of visited nodes needs to be maintained when charging stations are visited after nodes
with EVs and nodes that require EVs are visited after either charging stations or nodes with
EVs. Second, the capacity constraint must be satisfied when nodes with EVs are visited
only when there is a driver in a shuttle and nodes with drivers are visited only if there is
seating available for a driver in the shuttle. In addition to feasibility constraints, since both
charging and relocations of EVs are involved in the shuttle routing problem, only considering
factors that affect the total distance traveled is not sufficient. Moreover, the dynamics of
an urban network due to routing a shuttle is more complex compared to the VRP due to
the delayed movements of EVs relocation. Also, routing multiple shuttles requires a novel
training algorithm. In particular, when several shuttles are present in an urban network and
each of their movement influence the state of the network, we need a novel framework that
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enables the application of reinforcement learning tools based on Markov Decision Process
(MDP).
3.3 Problem Statement and Formulations
3.3.1 Network
Let us consider a network N consisting of N number of nodes and a depot. We define a
node as a supplier if it has an excess EV and a demander if it requires an EV. The network
also has charger nodes. Each node in the network can store at most one EV. Depending on
the charging levels of EVs there are two possibilities of the EVs relocation. In Case I, EVs
are relocated from supplier nodes directly to demander nodes. In Case II, EVs first need
to be taken to charger nodes, and after charging is complete, they need to be relocated to
the demander nodes, as shown in Figure 3.1. We consider discrete charging levels of EVs,
where a threshold-based rule is applied to decide whether to charge an EV or not. Also, a
driver may wait at a charging station until an EV is fully charged or may head for the next
activity. We consider two settings of the problem when a single shuttle or a fleet of shuttles
is deployed for rebalancing the system. We formulate the routing problem for a single shuttle
as MDP and utilize a central controller to route a fleet of shuttles.
3.3.2 Multi-shuttle Routing as MDP
Even though it is possible to formulate the routing of a fleet of shuttles using a multiagent reinforcement learning framework, such an approach suffers from several drawbacks.
Firstly, in the presence of several shuttles, each of which is treated as an autonomous agent,
the stationary assumption of MDP is no longer valid Buşoniu et al. (2010). Therefore, a
multi-agent reinforcement learning framework works under partially observable MDP Lowe
et al. (2017); Gupta et al. (2017); Foerster et al. (2018), when each agent can observe only a
local view of the network Oliehoek et al. (2016). Then each agent can only visit nodes visible
from its local view, which imposes significant restrictions on developing an efficient routing.
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Secondly, it is challenging to train autonomous agents without making strong assumptions
about constant communication between agents. For instance, if at the current time step one
agent selects a node to visit, then such information must be shared among other agents to
avoid the presence of several agents at the same node. Lastly, under a static network, when
the state of the network is constant and well-known, a centralized approach will help navigate
a fleet of shuttles efficiently. Therefore, we formulate routing multiple shuttles to rebalance
FFEVSS using a central controller responsible for making routing decisions of all shuttles.
Then, we can formulate the problem using a single-agent reinforcement learning framework
and MDP. We also note that the concept of multi-agent reinforcement learning and central
controller is similar to decentralized control and centralized control in the transportation
literature.
A fleet of shuttles with drivers leaves a depot and visits nodes in the network to relocate
EVs from supplier nodes to demander nodes. Shuttles must return to a depot after fulfilling
demand at all demander nodes and picking up all the drivers. These sequential decisions of
a central controller for routing shuttles under uncertain demand (locations of drivers) can
be formulated as a finite horizon MDP, where the future dynamics of the system depend
only on the current state. We define the RL framework for the problem as tuple M =
hX, A, P, R, T i representing states, actions, transition probabilities, reward function, and
time horizon, respectively. The definitions are as follows:
• I = {1, ..., I} is the set of I shuttles that are controlled by a central controller;
• State set X represents the network, where for each node it shows its location, the
relative distance, the number of EVs, the number of drivers, the charging levels of EVs’
and indicators for the expected transitions. We utilize binary vectors to indicate if
there is an expected EV coming to a node. We denote state as xt at time t.
• A is the set of joint actions such that At = A1t × A2t × · · · × AIt , where Ait is the action
set of shuttle i at time t and action ait indicates a node number to be visited next by
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Table 3.1: A summary of variables.
I
X
τ
T
R
θc
Y

the set of shuttles
the state of network
traveling time
the max number of time steps
total reward
parameters of critic
the set of visited nodes

A
tc
w
r
θa
π
n

the set of joint actions
current clock time
waiting time
immediate reward
parameters of actor
routing policy
node in network

shuttle i. Then a central controller’s action set consists of joint actions of all shuttles,
At , at time t.
• Transition Probabilities, P , determines state transitions probabilities p(xt+1 |xt , at ) at
time t with respect to taken action at . In the given problem, transitions are deterministic but often delayed. After an action is taken, the relocations of EVs are scheduled.
However, the actual state transitions related to the movements of EVs occur later, as
shown in Figure 3.4.
• All shuttles share a common reward R and immediate reward rt , which are assigned
based on the joint actions of all shuttles at time t denoted by at and state xt ;
• Instead of defining the specific time value of T , we define one episode rollout for the
problem based on the experiment outcomes. One episode is terminated either if all
demander nodes are fulfilled and all drives are picked up back to a depot or if the total
number of time steps exceeds the predefined maximum time steps, the value of which
is set based on the size of a network.
• Each time step t is determined by the earliest fulfilled action among all shuttles. Thus,
each time step starts when a central controller takes an action and finishes whenever
any action is fully executed.
The list of variables used can be found in Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.5: An overview of the reinforcement learning model.
3.4 Reinforcement Learning Model
We adopt a policy gradient method, similar to those popularly used in routing problems
Nazari et al. (2018); Kool et al. (2018); James et al. (2019), to learn the complex routing
policies of shuttles directly. In general, policy gradient methods consist of two separate
networks: an actor and a critic. The critic estimates a value function given a state according
to which the actor’s parameters are set to generate policies in the direction of improvement.
We train an agent and a central controller to route a single shuttle and multiple shuttles
in an urban network by simulating the FFEVSS environment. The simulator is developed
to handle EV relocations through rule-based decisions and utilizing sequence-to-sequence
models to generate policies. The overview of the model is shown in Figure 3.5.
3.4.1 The FFEVSS Simulator
The main function of the FFEVSS simulator is to represent the dynamics in an urban
network caused by movements of shuttles. There are immediate and delayed transitions
related to routing shuttles. In an immediate update to the environment at each time step, we
consider locations of shuttles, drivers, EVs, the number of drivers in a shuttle, and fulfillment
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of scheduled transitions either related to charging or relocation of EVs. Also, at each time
step, we schedule transitions related to movements of EVs that have started but unfulfilled.
In particular, starting at the current clock time tc = 0, we update the environment according
to movements of a shuttle:

tc ←



tc + τ (nt−1 , nt ) if nt−1 6= nt

tc + wt

if nt−1 = nt

where τ represents traveling time between nodes visited by a shuttle at time t−1 and t and wt
denotes waiting time at node n. We define waiting time at node n as the difference between
the time when a delayed transition at node n occurs and the time when a shuttle reaches
node n. To account for delayed transitions, we introduce a time vector, which keeps track
of remaining times until either EVs arrive at designated nodes or their charging completes.
In the case of multiple shuttles, the environment is updated with the earliest movements of
shuttles.
Another function of the FFEVSS simulator is to update a masking scheme according to
the current state of the urban network. The masking scheme helps to maintain the feasibility
of solutions related to the precedence of visited nodes and the number of drivers in a shuttle.
Also, having an efficient masking scheme expedites the exploration of action space. We
deploy the following masking scheme, where At = ∅ stores the set of available nodes/actions
to visit at time t and the rest of the nodes are masked. For each n ∈ N , we update:

At ←



At ∪ {n} if lt > 0 and n ∈ Dt ∪ Et

At ∪ {n} if lt = 0 and n ∈ Dt

Here set Et denotes nodes with an EV or nodes with the expected EV due to delayed transitions, set Dt denotes nodes with a driver or nodes with the expected drivers, and lt denotes
the number of drivers in a shuttle at time t.
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3.4.2 EV Relocation Decisions
As described earlier, our focus in this study is to solve the shuttle routing problem. Hence,
we are using a rule-based approach for EVs’ relocation decisions. The rule-based approach
is as follows: every time a supplier node with an EV has a driver, that EV is relocated to
the nearest available either charger or demander node. The decision of whether to relocate
an EV to a demander or charger node is predetermined in the settings of a simulator. We
apply a threshold-based rule; that is, if the charging level of an EV exceeds the threshold,
then it can be directly relocated to a demander node or must be charged, otherwise.
We maintain a binary vector in the simulator to indicate if a charger node is available or
not. This representation helps in deciding the relocation of an EV from a supplier node to
an available charger node. We determine the closest available charger node by multiplying
the binary vector by a time matrix that indicates time to travel among any pair of nodes.
To decide EVs’ relocations from either supplier or charger nodes to demander nodes, we
maintain a demand matrix that keeps track of demander nodes that still need an EV at time
t. In particular, in the simulator, we store the time needed to move from all nodes to each
demander node and increase those values to large numbers if a demander node is satisfied.
Then, if an EV needs to be relocated to a demander node, we compute the minimum time
from a node to the closest demander nodes.
3.4.3 A Sequence-to-sequence Model for the Shuttle Routing Problem
Motivated by Nazari et al. (2018), we propose using a sequence-to-sequence model for
rebalancing FFEVSS, which typically consists of an encoder and a decoder. Given urban
network N , we aim to generate a sequence of nodes to be visited by either a shuttle or a fleet
of shuttles. In other words, we are interested in learning the following conditional probability
or parametrized policy πθ :
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πθ (YT |x0 ) =

T
−1
Y

φ(yt+1 |xt , Yt )

(3.1)

t=0
n
In (3.1), we let xt = {x1t , . . . , xN
t }, where xt denotes static and dynamic states of node n

at time t. Unlike in machine translation, the state of nodes in the network status changes
dynamically with shuttles movement; thus, we need to consider both static and dynamic
states for each node. Also, we let yt denote a node to be visited at time t and Yt =
{y1 , . . . , yt } with Y0 = ∅. Then to select a next node to visit yt+1 , we are interested in
learning φ(yt+1 |xt , Yt ).
However, a set of nodes in the network does not convey any sequential information.
Therefore, it is common in literature Nazari et al. (2018), to omit recurrent neural network
for encoding. Indeed, due to the sparse nature of networks, graph embedding is deployed
in encoder to build their continuous vector representation as they suit better for statistical
learning Perozzi et al. (2014). The following equation describes embedding for each n ∈ N :
xns = bs + W s xns

(3.2)

xndt = bd + W d xndt

(3.3)

where, xns and xndt are embedded static and dynamic states of node n at time t and b, W
represent the trainable parameters of a neural network. We denote by xnt = (xns ; xndt ) concatenation of embedded static and dynamic states of nodes.
For decoding we use recurrent neural networks (RNN), that takes static state of the last
visited node and stores the sequence as follows:
ht = W h f (ht−1 ) + W x xns

(3.4)

where ht is a memory state of RNN, f represents nonlinear transformation and xns is a
static state of node n visited at time t. Trainable weight matrices W h and W x represent
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connections between hidden state to hidden state and hidden state to an input respectively.
Note in our implementations, we use a LSTM cell as RNN.
In addition to encoder and decoder, we also utilize content based attention mechanism
as in Nazari et al. (2018). Content based attention tries to mimic associative memory and is
designed to handle cases when an input to the sequence-to-sequence model is a set Vinyals
et al. (2015a). In particular, the current state of an urban network is coupled with the
memory state of RNNs about the sequence to calculate an alignment vector ct that assigns
the probabilities of nodes to visit next:
unt = v tanh(W (xnt ; ht ))
ct = softmax(ut )

∀n ∈ N

(3.5)
(3.6)

where v and W are trainable weight matrices.
For the problem under study, we define the static state of nodes as their location coordinates and the initial charging levels of EVs at supplier nodes. Even though the charging
levels of EVs will change as EVs are taken to charging stations, only their initial values determine charging times. Therefore, we consider them as a static state of nodes. For a dynamic
representation of the states of nodes, we use the number of EVs, the number of drivers in a
shuttle, and the distance from the current node to other nodes. Our experimental studies
show that passing distance information as a dynamic state of nodes substantially reduces
training time. Figures 3.5 summarizes the sequence-to-sequence model of the shuttle routing
problem used in the actor network. In routing a fleet of shuttles, we also deploy a single
actor network, where a sequence of visited nodes Yt , includes nodes visited by all shuttles
up to time t.
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3.4.4 Reward Function
Reward function along with sets of available actions reflects our aim to maintain the
feasibility and efficiency of routing decisions. Since the shuttle routing problem considers
both charging and relocation of EVs, reward function must not only reflect traveling times
between nodes, but also include waiting times. Therefore, we define reward function as the
negative of total time spent in the system starting when a shuttle or a fleet of shuttles leaves
a depot and ending when all shuttles are returned back to the depot with all drivers after
fulfilling all demander nodes. Then our aim is to maximize the negative of total time spent
in the system denoted by R. More formally we define reward function as follows, using
immediate rewards rt :
R=

T
X

rt

(3.7)

t=1

where
rt =



−τ (nt−1 , nt ) if nt−1 6= nt
if nt−1 = nt


−wt

and τt is traveling time and wt is waiting time at time t.
3.4.5 Training Algorithm
In training, we are interested in finding policy parameters θ that maximize the total
expected reward:

θ = arg max Eπθ [R].

(3.8)

θ

Given the state of network X, we can write:

J(θ|x) = Eπ∼pθ (·|x) [R(π|x)]

(3.9)
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and
∇θ J(θ|x) = Eπ [Aπ ∇θ log pθ (π|x)]

(3.10)

Aπ = R(π|x) − V (x0 ).

(3.11)

We use the REINFORCE algorithm with a baseline Williams (1992), which is the value
of the initial state of an urban network estimated by a critic with trainable parameters
θc . Algorithm 3 represents our training procedure, where the actor network with trainable
parameters θa represents policy π. In a batch training setting, the batch of instances is
generated by a data generator. Instances are passed through the simulator. Then, the
actor network produces probabilities of nodes to be visited by shuttles at each time step,
and the simulator is updated accordingly until the entire episode is finished. Then with the
received total reward for the selected actions, the parameters of the actor and critic networks
are updated. Unlike in the existing literature Haider et al. (2019), the algorithm does not
require splitting an urban network into sub-clusters for each shuttle, but instead deploys all
shuttles to serve the whole network. Also, utilizing a central controller that observes the
entire urban network state along with the masking scheme in the simulator allows efficiently
exploring joint action of all shuttles. For instance, if a node has been assigned to be visited
by a shuttle, then that node is masked for other shuttles.
3.5 Computational Studies
3.5.1 Data Generation and Configurations
We consider a 1 × 1 square mile network consisting of demander, supplier, and charger
nodes. We first specify the total number of nodes in the network and the number of demander
and charger nodes. We sample x, y coordinate of each node from a uniform distribution
with values ranging from 0 to 1. Similarly, we sample demander, charger, and supplier nodes
from a uniform distribution. For each supplier node we set the initial charging levels of EVs
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Algorithm 3: Training Algorithm
Input: Initialize network parameters θa and θc for actor and critic networks
respectively. Set the maximum number of epochs, a batch size and the
maximum number of steps denoted as Mepochs , Mepis and T respectively;
1 for epochs = 1 to Mepochs do
2
Reset gradients dθa , dθc ;
3
for m = 1 to Mepis do
4
data ∼ DataGenerator(ρ);
5
xm
0 , A0 = simulator.reset(data);
m
6
Add xm
0 to X0 , set R = 0, set L to I;
7
for t=0 to T do
8
foreach i ∈ L do
9
ait , pit = actor network(xt , Ait );
10
Store pit in pm , remove ait from At ;
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

xt+1 , At+1 , rt , tc = simulator.step(at );
Empty set L;
foreach i ∈ I do
if ait is complete at tc then
add i to L
else
ait+1 = ait and remove ait from At+1
Rm = Rm + rt ;
Calculate V m (xm
0 ; θc ) using critic;
P
M
epis
1
m
m m
m
dθa = Mepis
m=1 (R − V (x0 ; θc ))∇θa log p ;
PMepis
1
m
m m
2
dθc = Mepis
m=1 ∇θc (R − V (x0 ; θc )) ;
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Table 3.2: Hyperparamter values
Conv1D, LSTM hidden dim 128 Conv1D kernel size
1
Critic, linear hidden dim
128 Learning rate actor, critic 10−4
randomly between 1 and 5. We assume that EVs do not need charging and can be directly
taken to demander nodes if their charging levels exceed 3. Otherwise, EVs first need to
be taken to charger nodes, where all of them are charged until the charging level of 5 is
reached. For each charging level, we assign the charging time equal to the average traveling
time between all pairs of nodes in the network. We do not consider discharging rates in the
movements of EVs, while we assume the constant velocity for EVs equal to 45 miles/hour.
Computational experiments are conducted with 2 Intel Xeon E5-2630 2.2 GHz 20-Core
Processors, 32 GB RAM, and the Ubuntu 18.04.4 LTS operating system. All implementations are done in Python 3.7 using PyTorch 1.5. Our implementations of the critic network
have similarities to the actor network structure except for the use of LSTM. We first embed
the initial static state of the urban network using 1D convolution networks and then pass
it to the attention mechanism. We pass the output of the attention mechanism through a
sequence of feed-forward networks to obtain the final estimate for a value function. Table
3.2 represents the hyperparameters used for training, which are the same as in Nazari et al.
(2018). We train RL agents on networks of various sizes and difficulty levels. For each problem class defined by the size of a network, we consider instances with three different levels of
difficulty. Cases when there is an abundant presence of charging stations than the number
of EVs requiring charging we call easy instances. Similarly, cases when there is an exact
number of charging stations as the number of demander nodes we call medium difficulty
instances. Finally, in cases when there is a less number of charging stations than the number
of demander nodes, we call them hard instances. The descriptions of difficulty levels are
found in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Difficulty levels description, where De, Ch, Su, and Su denote the set of demanders, chargers, suppliers, and suppliers with EVs that require charging, respectively.
Easy

Medium
0

Hard
0

0

|N |

|De|

|Ch|

|Su|

|Su |

|De|

|Ch|

|Su|

|Su |

|De|

|Ch|

|Su|

|Su |

23
50
100

7
16
33

7
16
33

8
17
33

4
8
16

7
16
33

7
16
33

8
17
33

8
17
33

8
17
33

6
15
32

8
17
34

8
17
34

3.5.2 RL Agents and Benchmarks
We train three types of agents using the proposed RL models. The first agent denoted as
gen-RL is trained on all three difficulty levels, but on a fixed network size. The second agent
denoted as net-RL is trained on networks of various sizes, but it is tailored to a specific
difficulty level. The last agent denoted as RL is trained on a fixed network size and on
a specific difficulty level. For our computational studies, we consider a benchmark from
Haider et al. (2019). The benchmark model denotes as Sim represents a joint model that
solves the EVs relocation and the shuttle routing problems simultaneously. To solve multishuttle routing problems, the heuristic splits an urban network into some clusters and solves
a single-shuttle routing problem for each cluster. However, there are some limitations to
the method. One of them is related to the inflexibility of the solutions when drivers that
have been dropped off from one shuttle cannot be picked up by other shuttles. Another
disadvantage is related to charger nodes. The heuristic can only handle cases when the
number of charger nodes is not less than the number of EVs that must be charged.
3.5.3 Results on Random Instances
Figure 3.6 shows training rewards for the multi-shuttle problems on the network with 23
nodes and 3 drivers. Overall, training time depends on the network size, its structure, and
the features passed to the actor network. Using distance information from the current node
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Table 3.4: Comparison of RL agents in terms of total time spent in the system, the average
of 128 test instances are reported. In bold are the best results.
Easy
|N |
23
50
100

|I| |Dr| net-RL
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3

3
3
2
3
3
2
3
3
2

9.29
6.01
5.48
14.97
8.54
7.22
23.16
12.91
10.23

gen-RL

Medium
RL

net-RL

gen-RL

8.34
7.70
5.79
5.40
5.28
5.21
13.96 13.77
8.21
8.41
6.90
6.89
22.98 22.18
14.25 12.92
10.21 10.21

14.63
7.93
7.02
20.35
11.81
9.58
30.62
17.55
13.39

11.75
8.45
7.58
19.36
10.81
9.41
32.33
18.42
13.73

Hard
RL net-RL gen-RL
10.27
6.93
6.38
17.93
11.23
9.23
30.67
17.54
13.33

16.01
8.89
8.33
22.60
12.15
10.33
31.53
17.21
13.69

RL

13.73 12.32
9.00
8.34
8.11
7.79
20.05 18.92
11.76 11.96
9.89
9.77
32.30 36.67
18.79 17.90
13.67 14.94

to other nodes in the actor network results in better rewards compared to when not passing
such information.
To compare different RL agents’ performances, we conduct experiments on various network sizes and the degree of difficulty of instances and measure the mean of the total time
spent in the system out of 128 instances. Table 3.4 shows the experiments’ results. In most
instances, an RL agent trained on a specific size and a specific instance difficulty level tends
to perform the best. We observe that net-RL agents, trained on various network sizes, tend
to perform better on larger network sizes, while gen-RL agents, trained on various difficulty
levels, can be competitive on medium-sized networks. As the network size increases, the
results show that using net-RL and gen-RL agents can be beneficial. For the rest of the
experiments, we use RL agents.
Table 3.5 illustrates the performance of the RL solutions with those of the heuristic optimization method, labeled Sim. The reinforcement learning approach can solve all instances
of the problem, while the optimization method can handle only easy and medium cases.
Moreover, for easy and medium cases measured in the mean of total time spent in the system, the RL solutions perform better than the heuristic optimization solutions. We also note
that the derived RL solutions do not solve for optimal relocation of EVs and are only based
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8.5
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Figure 3.6: Training rewards with and without distance as an input

Table 3.5: RL model vs. the heuristic optimization in terms of total time spent in the system,
the percentages of winning instances and computational time in seconds, the average of 128
test instances are reported. In bold are the best results.
Easy
Mean
|N |

|I|

|Dr|

Sim

23

1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3

3
3
2
3
3
2
3
3
2

8.81
5.72
5.27
17.34
9.19
6.96
34.20
16.11
11.71

50
100

Win %
RL

RL-Sim

Med
Time, s
Sim

RL

Mean
Sim

7.70 85.94%
7.07 0.01 12.39
5.40 65.63%
1.61 0.04 7.43
5.21 51.56%
0.91 0.06 6.39
13.77 96.09% 48.43 0.05 24.59
8.41 74.22% 11.62 0.21 12.25
6.89 53.13%
5.35 0.20 9.25
22.18 100.00% 152.15 0.16 45.97
12.92 100.00% 66.13 0.44 21.63
10.21 86.72% 28.23 0.92 15.63

Win %
RL

RL-Sim

Hard
Time, s
Sim

Mean

Time, s

RL

Sim

RL

Sim

RL

10.27 94.53% 13.98 0.02
6.93 73.44%
3.31 0.04
6.38 48.44%
1.71 0.05
17.93 100.00% 98.61 0.05
11.23 73.44% 23.47 0.16
9.23 50.00% 10.75 0.21
30.67 100.00% 599.36 0.17
17.54 96.09% 118.68 0.44
13.33 92.97% 53.86 1.03

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

12.32
8.34
7.79
18.92
11.96
9.77
36.67
17.90
14.94

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

0.02
0.09
0.11
0.06
0.25
0.35
0.26
0.55
1.02

58

on predefined rules, while the optimization heuristic solves for both the shuttle routing and
EV relocation problems.
Table 3.5 shows the performance comparison of Sim and RL models in terms of percentages of winning instances. For instance, in an RL-Sim pair comparison, the value of
cells under the column indicates the percentages of instances when the RL model performed
at least equally to Sim model out of 128 test instances. As shown in Table 3.5 the RL
model performs better than the heuristic method in at least 50% of all instances, except one
instance.
To show the generation of the instantaneous solutions using RL models, we measured
computation time. Table 3.5 demonstrates the computation time it takes to derive a solution
under Sim and RL models. We report an average time to solve an instance out of 128
instances in total. The difference in deriving solutions between Sim and RL models increases
up to 585 times in the case of a single shuttle routing in a network with 100 nodes for Easy
instances.
We also compare the effects of the number of drivers and difficulty levels on the trained
models. In particular, we train models with a specific number of drivers on easy, medium,
and hard instances on a fixed network size and check these models’ performances against
the models with varying a number of drivers and difficulty levels. For example, in Figure
3.7 rows indicate the problems’ configurations in testing and columns indicate the problems’
configurations in training datasets. The cells corresponding to a row and column show the
percentages of instances when a trained model outperformed the model specifically trained
for a test dataset. As we observe, models trained on specific difficulty levels tend to perform
better on similar instances with a different number of drivers compared to on test models
with the same number of drivers, but different difficulty levels.
The sample solution for a single-shuttle case, where 4 EVs in an urban network require
charging, is shown in Figure 3.8. A shuttle with 3 drivers leaves the depot and visits supplier
nodes first, followed by a charger node. By interchangeably visiting nodes thorough the
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Figure 3.7: The number of drivers vs. difficulty levels.
Table 3.6: The Amsterdam dataset structure and RL model vs. Sim on the dataset in terms
of total time spent in the system.

|N |

|I|

170

1
2
3

Demander
Supplier
Charger
Depo
Shuttle
EV

|Dr|

Weekdays

Weekends

Sim

Sim

RL

5 420.08 416.23
3 207.63 182.39
2 142.90 136.52

RL

411.59 433.63
224.88 185.06
153.38 142.20

6
5

10

4

11

12
7

3

13

15

14

2

9

16

17

1

8

Figure 3.8: Example solution for a single-shuttle case, |N | = 23, |Dr| = 3 and |I| = 1.
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12
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Figure 3.9: Example solution for a multiple-shuttle cases, |N | = 23, |Dr| = 3 and |I| = 2.
network, the shuttle returns to the depot after picking up drivers from demander nodes. We
can observe the versatility of the produced solutions by looking at the charging stations.
For instance, a driver dropped off at the first visited supplier node relocates the EV to a
charging station, waits there until the EV is charged, and then relocates it to a demander
node. Only then the driver is picked up by a shuttle. In another example, the driver dropped
off at the second visited supplier node is picked up immediately at a designated charging
station by a shuttle. Similarly, Figure 3.9 represents the sample solution for the case with
2 shuttles. Each shuttle visits supplier nodes first until it runs out of drivers. Then each of
them interchangeably visits charger, supplier, and demander nodes and returns to the depot.
The flexibility of the produced solutions can be observed when a driver originally dropped
at the second visited supplier node by the first shuttle is picked up at a charging station by
the second shuttle.
3.5.4 Results on the Amsterdam Cases
We also use real data of FFEVSS representing car2go operations in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands, which was collected between May 5th and October 29th, 2016. From the
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actual data, we collect locations of supplier, demander and charger nodes and reduce the
network by removing EVs that do not need relocation/charging. We also group the data
into weekdays and weekends, which results in 14 and 12 instances for the respective groups
that we use as test data for the experiments. To train an RL agent, we generate on the fly
training data by sampling locations of nodes using weekdays data by extracting the CDF
of the distribution for nodes’ coordinates. We also assign node types randomly by following
the similar structure observed in weekdays data. In particular, the training and testing data
have 170 nodes with 71 supplier, 71 demander, and 27 charger nodes. Table 3.6 presents the
results of the RL agent performance on the Amsterdam dataset. In all instances with except
one, the RL agent performs better as compared to the heuristic; overall, RL performs 6.17%
better. The poor performance of the RL agent in the instance with a single shuttle and 5
drivers on weekends may be improved by training with more weekend data.
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Chapter 4: Hybrid Model for Solving Travelling Salesman Problem with Drone
4.1 Introduction
Last mile delivery, which refers to the transportation of products from a distribution center to the doorstep of a customer, is an integral part of the supply chain. However, last mile
delivery is often not cost-effective due to transportation costs associated with individualized
shipments, complex routes, and various destinations. Therefore, emerging technologies such
as unarmed aerial vehicles (drones) are viewed as a potential breakthrough in reducing inefficiencies in last mile delivery. For instance, Amazon launched the Prime Air program which
aims to deliver parcels using drones Amazon (2021). Similarly, Wing owned by Alphabet
delivers books, meals, and medicine using drones Wing (2021). The steady development
of drone technology including its capacity and flying range enables transporting of various
products. For instance, HorseFly drone, used by UPS can carry packages up to 10 pounds
and has a flight time of 30 minutes UPS (2021).
While drones certainly have high speed and do not require any infrastructure such as
roads, bridges, etc., they also possess some limitations. Drones have a limited flying range,
which depends on battery life. Also, drones cannot carry parcels of many customers, thus
they must return every time to a distribution center to pick up customer orders. On the
other hand, trucks, which are traditionally used for last mile delivery, have a large capacity
to store all customer orders and can transport goods to long distances. However, trucks
usually have slow speeds due to congestion and require built infrastructure to reach their
destinations. Therefore, combining drone and truck is a promising tandem to improve the
efficiency of last mile delivery. Indeed, UPS has started testing combining drone and truck
to deliver goods UPS (2021). In this setting, a driver of the truck loads a package to drone
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and sends drone to an autonomous route to an address. Meanwhile truck can serve other
customers. When drone returns to truck, the driver swaps the battery of drone and launches
the next delivery.
To effectively deploy trucks and drones together for last mile delivery, we must answer
several challenging questions such as which customers should be served by drone, which
customers should be served by truck, where to recharge drone, how to route both drone
and truck, and etc. In the literature, the problem of routing of truck and drone is known
as Travelling Salesman Problem with Drone (TSPD) Agatz et al. (2018). The objective of
TSPD is to serve customers in a minimal time, while truck and drone are subjected to routing
constraints. TSPD is NP-hard problem Agatz et al. (2018), highlighting the need to develop
heuristic methods that can scale to large urban networks. Indeed, several exact and heuristic
methods have been proposed to solve TSPD in the operations research literature Poikonen
et al. (2019); Agatz et al. (2018). However, the proposed solutions fail to generalize and they
solve each instance of TSPD from scratch while suffering from either long computational
time or low solution quality. Therefore, in this study, we propose using deep reinforcement
learning (RL) to solve TSPD, where deep neural networks are utilized to process complex
urban network information to help an RL agent to route both truck and drone. Unlike
methods coming from the operations research literature, the proposed model generalizes to
all instances coming from the same distribution and the trained RL model produces good
quality solutions in a matter of seconds.
From a reinforcement learning modeling perspective, TSPD possesses some unique challenges. For instance, the RL agent must learn how to route drone and truck that operate in
a shared urban environment. In this case, we must promote cooperation in drone and truck
routing decisions while constrained by capacity and flying time limits. In particular, the
learned routing policies must consider the timely recharging of drone. Also, unlike regular
TSP, where after visiting each customer, that customer no longer needs to be revisited, TSPD
allows revisiting some customers, presenting a wider variety in routing decisions. Lastly, due
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to the distinct characteristics of truck and drone, the RL agent must efficiently explore all
resulting routing opportunities.
In this study, we present a novel deep reinforcement learning model called the hybrid
model to solve TSPD. The hybrid model consists of an attention encoder and LSTM decoder,
which allows to learning policies to promote cooperation in routing truck and drone. As our
computational studies show, the proposed hybrid model works well in solving regular TSP
and outperforms the existing methods in solving TSPD.
4.2 Related Work
Before presenting the proposed model, we briefly introduce some related studies to the
problem and the method.
4.2.1 TSPD
TSPD, in general, has many variants depending on the number of drones and trucks
used and routing operations involved in the literature Chung et al. (2020). Most studies
focus on a single truck and single drone variation of the problem and consider only customer
locations as possible points for recharging drone. Also, it is common to assume that drone
can carry only a single parcel at a time. Typically, TSPD is formulated as a mixed-integer
program and is known to be NP-hard. Therefore, the existing exact methods solve TSPD
with less than 20 customers, while relying on heuristic methods to handle large instances.
Some heuristics Agatz et al. (2018); Poikonen et al. (2019); Ha et al. (2018) first solve regular
TSP to generate a feasible solution and then assign customers to be served either by drone
or truck, while another set of heuristics first assign customers to either drone or truck and
then develop routes Wang and Sheu (2019). Nevertheless, the presented heuristics fail to
generalize and each instance of the problem must be resolved from scratch.
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4.2.2 RL for Combinatorial Optimization Problems
Recently reinforcement learning has received increased attention to solve combinatorial
optimization problems. For instance, Bello et al. (2016) proposed using Pointer Networks
Vinyals et al. (2015b) and policy gradient methods to solve TSP. Dai et al. (2017) proposed
graph embedding trained with DQN algorithm to solve a group of combinatorial problems.
Later, Nazari et al. (2018) showed inefficiencies of Pointer Networks and proposed adopting
Sequence to Sequence models with an attention mechanism. In particular, Nazari et al.
(2018) removed LSTM cells in the encoder and instead used element-wise projections, while
a LSTM cell served as a decoder to store the sequence of visited nodes. Dai et al. (2017);
Deudon et al. (2018) presented attention models to solve combinatorial problems. In particular, Kool et al. (2018) uses several layers of multi-head attention to encode a graph
and proposes the idea of context node used by a decoder to output probabilities of visiting
the next node. However, all the studies above focus on well-known problems such as TSP,
Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) and route only a single-vehicle. Another set of studies focus on routing a fleet of vehicles Sykora et al. (2020); Bogyrbayeva et al. (2020) consisting
of homogeneous vehicles. However, TSPD considers routing multiple heterogeneous vehicles including truck and drone, which have different properties including different routing
constraints.
4.3 The Hybrid Model
We consider a fully connected graph G with a set of nodes N representing customer
locations, where the distances between nodes are computed using the Euclidean distance.
Given the state of a graph x, we aim to learn the routing policy of drone and truck,π, and
generate the sequence of nodes to be visited Y . Then using the chain rule, we aim to learn
the following conditional probability parametrized by θ:
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Figure 4.1: An overview of the hybrid model.

πθ (YT |G) =

T
Y

p(yt+1 |xt , Yt )

(4.1)

t=0

The state of a graph xt at time t consists of the static and dynamic features of nodes
such as coordinates and distances from other nodes. We start with an empty set Y at time
t = 0. We develop the hybrid model consisting of an attention-based encoder and a LSTM
cell as a decoder to learn πθ as shown in Figure 4.1. Encoder embeddes the static elements
of a graph including the locations of customers. Decoder takes as an input the coordinates
of the last visited node and stores the sequence of visited nodes. The outputs of encoder
and decoder are passed to the attention which outputs the probabilities of visiting the next
node.
4.3.1 Encoder
Given a graph with a set of nodes N , we have coordinates of each node in 2-dimensional
Euclidean space. Let xn represent x and y coordinates for node n. To embed such a fully
connected graph we start from the initial embeddings of the nodes using linear projection:
h0n = W x x + bx

∀n ∈ N

(4.2)
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(a) The structure of Encoder.

(b) m-th head of MHA in the first layer.

Figure 4.2: Encoder overview.

where W x and bx are learnable parameters. These initial embeddings of nodes h0 are then
passed through L number of attention layers. Each attention layer, l, consists of two sublayers: a multi-head attention layer and a fully connected feed-forward layer as shown in Figure
4.2a.
A multi-head attention (MHA) layer takes as an input the output of the previous layer
(either output from the initial embedding or the output of the previous attention layer) and
passes messages between nodes. In particular, for each input to MHA we compute the values
of q ∈ Rdq , k ∈ Rdq , v ∈ Rdv or queries, keys and values respectively by projecting the input
hn :

qn = W Q hn ,

kn = W K kn ,

vn = W V hn

∀n ∈ N

(4.3)

where, W Q , W K , W V are trainable parameters with sizes (dk × dh ), (dk × dh ) and (dv × dh )
respectively. From keys and queries we compute compatibility between nodes i and j as
follows since we consider the fully connected graph:
q> kj
ui,j = √i
dk

∀i, j ∈ N

(4.4)
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We use compatibility ui,j to compute the attention weights, ai,j ∈ [0, 1] using softmax:
euij
u 0
i,j
j0 e

(4.5)

ai,j = P

Then a message received by node n is a convex combination of messages received from all
nodes as shwon in Figure 4.2b:
0

hn =

X

(4.6)

an,j vj

j

Instead of using a single head, we use a multi head attention with head size M , which allows
to pass different messages from other nodes. Then after computing messages from each head
using Equation 4.5, we can combine all massages coming to node n as follows:
MHAn (h1 , . . . , hN ) =

M
X

0

WmO hnm

(4.7)

1

The output of the MHA sublayer along with skip connection is passed through Batch Normalization:
b l = BNl (MHA(hl−1 , . . . , hl−1 ))
h
n
1
N

(4.8)

The output of Batch Normalization then passed through fully connected feed forward (FF)
network with ReLu activation function. We again apply skip connecion and batch normalization to the output of FF.
b l + FFl (h
b l ))
hln = BNl (h
n
n

(4.9)

b l )) = W ff,1 · ReLU(W ff,0 h
b l + bff,0 ) + bff,1
FFl (h
n
n

(4.10)

where

The overview of encoder is shown in Figure 4.2.
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4.3.2 Decoder
Given the encoder outputs as embeddings of each node in the graph, we pass to the
LSTM the embedding of the last node selected hLlt .

et, e
e t+1 , e
ct ))
h
ct+1 = rnn(hLlt , (h

(4.11)

e t and e
where h
ct correspond to the hidden and cell states of the LSTM at time t.
After applying dropout to the output of RNN, we pass its hidden state to attention along
with embeddings of all nodes and the distance information from the current location of a
decision taker :
e t+1 ; W d di,j ])
ai,j = va> tanh(Wa [h; h

(4.12)

where i represents the current location of a decision taker, h is the embeddings of all nodes
e t+1 is a hidden state of LSTM, di,j is the distance from the current node to all
in the graph, h
other nodes, va , Wa , W d are trainable parameters. Then the computed attention is passed
through softmax to produce the probabilities of visiting next node.

pi = P

eaij
a 0
i,j
j0 e

(4.13)

Figure 4.3 gives the overview of decoder.
4.4 The Central Controller for Routing
To route both drone and truck in a shared urban environment, we deploy the idea of
a central controller. Then a central controller observes the entire graph and cooperatively
routes drone and truck to finish serving customers in a minimal time. We can formalize
routing drone and truck using a central controller as Markov Decision Process (MDP), where
only the current state of the graph defines the next node to be visited. Then we aim to learn
directly the policy to route drone and truck using the policy gradient methods. In particular,
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Figure 4.3: Decoder overview
actor network in a form of the hybrid model learns the routing policy, while critic estimates
the total time needed to serve all customers given the initial state of the urban network.
Algorithm 4: Distributed training for TSPD
Input: Generate a set of K multiple parallel agents, A = {a1 , . . . , aK }. Initialize
c
a
} of A. Set
}, {θ1c , . . . , θK
actor and critic networks parameters {θ1a , . . . , θK
the maximum number of epochs, Mepochs ;
1 for epochs = 1 to Mepochs do
2
Initialize a set of test rewards, R = {};
3
for k = 1 to K do
4
Reset gradients dθka , dθkc ;
5
Bk ∼ DataGenerator(ρ);
6
RolloutUpdate(ak , Bk );
7
rk = Test(ak );
8
R = R ∪ rk ;
9
10
11
12

j ← arg min(R);
for k = 1 to K do
θka ← θja ;
θkc ← θjc

For an efficient exploration of an RL agent, we trained the model in a distributed setting
as shown in Algorithm 4 . First, we generate multiple RL agents in a parallelized manner
with the same initial weights. Then each agent rollouts a batch of episodes with different
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Algorithm 5: RolloutUpdate
Input: Batch of data B with a number of episodes denoted Mepis , an agent id k.
Set the maximum number of steps denoted, T ;
1 Create an empty list logs, set R = 0;
2 Initialize (e
h0 , e
c0 );
3 x0 , mask0 = simulator.reset(B);
4 for t=0 to T do
e ct0 ) = actor-network(xtr , mask tr , (e
5
atr
ht , e
ct ));
t , log, (ht0 , e
t
t
6
add log to logs;
7
adt , log, (e
ht , e
ct ) = actor-network(xdt , masktd , (e
ht0 , e
ct0 ));
8
add log to logs;
d
9
xt+1 , mask, rt = simulator.step(atr
t , at );
10
R = R + rt ;
P2T
11 logs =
t=0 logst ;
c
12 Calculate V (x0 ; θk ) using critic;
P
Mepis
m
1
a
m
m m c
13 dθk =
m=1 (R − V (x0 ; θk ))∇θka logs ;
Mepis
PMepis
1
c
m
m m c 2
14 dθk =
m=1 ∇θkc (R − V (x0 ; θk )) ;
Mepis
data instances generated by a distrubution denoted as ρ and updates its weights by the
REINFORCE algorithm (Williams, 1992) using the advantage function as a baseline as
shown in Algorithm 5. Each agent tests the updated weights with a shared test instance.
Finally, we pick the agent with the best testing reward, and copy the weight of the best
agent to the weight of the other agents. We repeat this procedure iteratively each epoch
during training.
4.5 Computational Experiments
4.5.1 Data Generation and Configurations
We consider a graph on 100×100 square miles, where x and y coordinates of each node are
sampled from a uniform distribution with values ranging from 1 to 100. Similarly, we sample
x and y coordinates of depot from a uniform distribution with values ranging from 0, 1. For
the general setting of TSPD, we consider an infinite time range for drone. However, drone
can visit a single customer per launch and after serving a customer it must be recharged.

72

Each node in a graph can be visited by either drone, truck or by both, but only once. Then
we develop a masking scheme to restrict available nodes to be visited by drone or truck
according to the above assumptions.
Our implementations are done in Python 3.8 using PyTorch 1.5. The architecture of the
critic network has similarities to the actor network, except we do not use recurrent neural
networks. The goal of the critic network is to estimate the total time needed to serve all the
customers and return back to depot, which is achieved through embedding the initial state
of the graph. In particular, we embed x and y coordinates of the nodes through elementwise projections with 1D convolution networks whose outputs are passed through attention
followed by feed-forward networks.
4.5.2 Benchmarks and RL Methods
There are exisist two groups of methods to solved TSPD. The first group solves the problem exactly and allows revisiting nodes visited both by drone and truck (Agatz et al., 2018).
The second group solves the problem using the heuristic methods by splitting the graph into
several subgraphs Poikonen et al. (2019). For instance, divide-and-conquer heuristic (DCH)
of Poikonen et al. (2019) splits the network into n-groups and solves each subgroup using
the TSP-ep-all heuristic of Agatz et al. (2018). The TSP-ep-all heuristic aims to partition
exactly a graph into nodes to be served by drone and truck, by considering different combinations. Therefore, TSP-ep-all provides high-quality solutions on small-sized graphs and
fails to generalize into large-sized graphs.
There are exist two methods by which we sample solutions from the trained hybrid model.
In the first method called greedy, we always select nodes with the highest probabilities to
visit at each time step. In the second method, called sampling, we sample several solutions
from the trained model, by selecting randomly nodes to visit from output probabilities. Then
we select the sample solution with the lowest reward as the final solution.
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Table 4.1: The optimal solutions vs. Reinforcement Learning solutions on a grpah with 11
nodes.

Instance

Optimal RL Greedy

Gap Greedy, %

RL Sampling

Gap Sampling, %

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

221.19
205.76
192.96
241.26
248.14
217.69
237.34
214.77
256.34
227.90

223.41
205.76
203.93
241.26
248.82
217.69
244.95
226.64
269.80
227.90

1.00
0.00
5.68
0.00
0.27
0.00
3.21
5.53
5.25
0.00

223.41
205.76
200.01
241.26
248.82
217.69
237.34
225.36
256.83
227.90

1.00
0.00
3.65
0.00
0.27
0.00
0.00
4.93
0.19
0.00

mean

226.33

231.01

2.09

228.44

1.01

4.5.3 Results
First, we measure the performance of the hybrid model against the optimal solutions
(Agatz et al., 2018). In a graph with 11 nodes with 10 instances shown in Table 4.1, the
greedy RL solutions result in 2.09% optimality gap, while the sampling method reduced the
optimality gap by half. Figure 4.4, represents the optimal solution of 6-th instance found by
the greedy RL method. After leaving the depot, drone and truck visit customer locations and
drone returns back to the customers served by truck to recharge. We also, note that drone
mostly serves customers located far away from depot and in total travels longer distances
compared to truck.
In the second set of experiments we compare the performance of the proposed model
against the heuristics from the operations research literature in graphs of various sizes. As
shown in Table 4.2, the sampling RL method outperforms the existing heuristic in a majority
of instances. Table 4.3 shows the computational time of heuristics and reinforcement learning
agents, where a greedy solution can be invoked instantaneously.

74

Combined Node
Truck Node
Drone Node
Depot
Truck Route
Drone Route

5

76

3

8

4

4
2

9

5

3

2

6

10

1
1

Figure 4.4: An example optimal solution produced by RL.

Table 4.2: The heuristic solutions vs. reinforcement learning solutions on a grpah with a
various number of nodes. The average of 100 instances are reported.
N
11
15
20
50
100

TSP-ep-all

DCH

RL Greedy

Gap Greedy, %

RL Sampling

Gap Sampling %

230.57
255.53
281.71 292.11
- 423.89
- 570.90

234.48
262.63
288.55
439.20
568.60

1.89
2.80
2.46
3.82
-0.48

229.15
256.03
282.10
412.29
548.92

-0.41
0.23
0.16
-2.53
-3.85

Table 4.3: The computational time of the heuristics and reinforcement learning agents on
a grpah with a various number of nodes in terms of CPU time, sec. The average of 100
instances are reported.
N

TSP-ep-all

DCH

11
15
20
50
100

0.12
0.50
0.57
-

0.04
0.10
0.34

RL Greedy RL Sampling
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02

1.13
1.61
1.72
5.27
20.15
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Research Directions
In this dissertation, we use optimization and machine learning approaches to solve problems in urban transportation.
In the first problem, we propose the design of an iterative combinatorial auction for the
fractional ownership of AVs. The auction allows bidding for combinations of time slots for
customers with no restrictions on their lengths. Also, the iterative nature of the auction
enables customers to learn the bidding prices needed to win interested time slots. We also
devise practical tools such as algorithms and user agents to help bidders and an auctioneer
apply the auction in the real life.
As a future direction, the auction can include machine learning methods to learn the
bidding behavior of customers to help them to generate new time slots to bid and learn
the bidding prices for the packages of time slots. Also, the Winner Determination Problem
solution methods can be advanced to improve the solution quality for auctions with multiple
homogenous vehicles. We also need to investigate how the properties of the auction will
change if a fleet of heterogeneous vehicles is offered.
In the second problem, we proposed a reinforcement learning approach to route a fleet
of homogenous shuttles to rebalance FFEVSS. The proposed methods allow solving the
challenging task of relocating and efficiently recharging EVs in a static network in the absence
of customer demand. Also, the flexibility of the reinforcement method enables to solve the
hard instances of the problem, when charging stations must be reused.
In the future, the problem can be extended to the dynamic version of the problem, when
we need to rebalance the system in the presence of customer demand. Also, the rule-based
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approach to decide where to relocate EVs can be replaced with a more sophisticated method
that will take into account the long-term rewards associated with relocating EVs.
In the last problem, we develop a novel hybrid model to route drone and truck to serve
customers for last mile delivery. The hybrid model allows to cooperatively route drone
and truck through encoding the graph using multi-head attention and decoding with the
combination of a LSTM cell and attention. The proposed method produces good quality
solutions and scales on large instances of the problem.
The hybrid model can be later applied to route multiple drones and trucks. Also, it
will be interesting to see other applications involving routing heterogenous vehicles being
solved by the hybrid model and the comparison of its results with other optimization and
reinforcement learning methods.
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